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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis explores the value of sabotage as a strategic tool in a multipolar world. 
More specifically, it examines if sabotage can play a role in imposing costs on 
competitors, limiting escalation, and shortening the duration of conflict. The return of 
multipolarity to the international system and the proliferation of advanced military 
capabilities has raised specters of doubt regarding conventional U.S. military methods of 
deterrence and coercion as well as the United States technological overmatch. This thesis 
argues that U.S. competitors’ military technologies and capabilities possess a grave 
vulnerability in that they rely heavily on specific critical infrastructure that is difficult to 
protect and repair. If these critical pieces of infrastructure are affected, competitors are 
incapable of effectively fielding or employing their forces. Historical case study analysis 
is used to identify past sabotage campaigns’ impact on strategic operations, validate 
sabotage’s potential in the modern world, and identify best practices for employing 
saboteurs. Finally, this analysis suggests the revival of sabotage as an option for engaging 
with bellicose states. 
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The return of multipolarity to the international system, generally referred to as 
Great Power Competition, has raised specters of doubt regarding traditional U.S. military 
methods of deterrence and coercion. More to the point, modern industrialized war is 
disastrous to all states who enter into it.1 Furthermore, massive investments by myriad 
countries and non-state actors in cutting-edge military equipment and training, combined 
with the continued proliferation of these capabilities worldwide, have brought into question 
the efficacy of conventional U.S. military intervention.2 In response to this, much of the 
U.S. defense enterprise and its industries have focused on high-tech solutions, such as 
artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons, cloud-based data systems, and robotics in an 
attempt to thwart this perceived lack of technological overmatch.3 While there is little 
doubt that next generation technology will assist in future competition, this thesis takes a 
different approach. This thesis uses historical case study analysis, to examine the value and 
potential of low-tech sabotage as a means to impose physical costs on adversaries. The 
purpose of this thesis is twofold. The first is to identify whether sabotage can serve as a 
costly signaling method that manages escalation between competitive states. The second is 
to ascertain whether during times of kinetic interstate competition between near-peer 
adversaries, if sabotage serves both as an escalation control measure and a viable economy 
of force operation. This two-fold approach provides historical analysis and 
recommendations for the future utilization of sabotage across the spectrum of modern 
competition.  
                                                 
1 Austin M. Carson, Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2018), 11. 
2 Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and Robert Work, Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial 
Challenge (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 2003), i. 
3 Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare (New York: 
Hachette Books, 2020), 12–17. 
2 
A. THE PROBLEM 
The counterterror and counterinsurgency campaigns of the last nineteen years have 
hyper-focused the U.S. military on specific capabilities and practices. This hyper-focus has 
understandably atrophied U.S. capabilities and strategy against near-peer adversaries. 
Furthermore, in the decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union comprehensive 
deterrence and coercion planning has been largely an afterthought.4 Now though, multiple 
potential adversaries, namely Russia and China, are dramatically more capable than they 
were just a decade ago.5 Adversary investments in modernization, training, and technology 
have significantly closed the gap between their capabilities and U.S. capabilities. While the 
U.S. maintains a powerful nuclear triad, it has traditionally relied on its ability to project 
conventional overt forces worldwide as its primary means of both deterrence and coercion. 
However, the current and projected proliferation of Anti-Access/ Area Denial (A2/AD) 
technologies alone threatens to unhinge this concept. No longer will U.S. conventional 
access to, or maneuver within, a region be guaranteed.6 U.S. platforms and capabilities will 
very likely become vulnerable targets as adversaries continue to develop robust and reliable 
kill chains.  
This impending situation implies that, the utilization of conventional military force 
against another state actor will not only risk a competent kinetic response, but also unduly 
create escalation conditions that could result in a major war. Furthermore, during such a 
kinetic escalation, the qualitative technological overmatch that U.S. forces have relied on 
for the last three decades is unlikely to exist. This concern is complicated further by the 
ability of several of these revisionist states, namely Russia and China, to conduct operations 
under a nuclear umbrella that is more than capable of nonconventional retaliation. Thus, 
the future use of conventional U.S. deterrence and coercion continues to decline in both 
feasibility and tenability.  
                                                 
4 Michael J. Mazarr, What Deters and Why: Exploring Requirements and Effective Deterrence of 
Interstate Aggression (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 1. 
5 Michael J Mazarr, “Understanding Deterrence,” Perspective: Expert Insights on a Timely Policy 
Issue (Santa Monica CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 1. 
6 Krepinevich, Watts, and Work, Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge, 1. 
3 
This pending inability has led many to opine that the United States must 
dramatically invest in “Leap Ahead” technologies and next generation capabilities. Dozens 
of new military commands and organizations focus on innovation, modernization, 
technology development and integration. Entire groups, such as the Army Futures 
Command Artificial Intelligence Task Force, focus on very specific technologies. The goal 
of all these organizations is to develop technology and platforms that maintain qualitative 
advantages over U.S. adversaries. While this is a lofty goal, it is prudent to point out that 
these technologies take considerable effort and investment with no guarantee that they will 
work. Often billed as transformational or a revolution in military affairs, very few of these 
technologies ever become operational. During the 2000s alone, the Pentagon spent over 
$59 billion on weapons programs that resulted in no new technology or capability.7 Even 
weapons platforms that do become operational can be fraught with problems. The F-35 
Joint Strike Fighter program has cost $428 billion dollars to date, is more than eight years 
behind schedule, and as of January 2020, had 873 known deficiencies, fifteen of which 
endangered the crew and airframe.8 This is not to say that the F-35 is a failure. It is to say 
that advanced systems take considerable time, money, testing and oftentimes a respectable 
number of growing pains before they come to fruition.  
These U.S. developments are also not being made in a vacuum. Adversaries and 
allies continue to develop, test, and field their own advanced capabilities in competition to 
U.S. efforts. China is the preeminent example of this. The Chinese government has heavily 
invested in emerging technologies, like 5G and hypersonic weapons, in hopes that they can 
outpace U.S. technological advances. Concurrently, the Chinese military has developed 
and fielded a number of platforms specifically designed to thwart conventional U.S. threats. 
These systems include layered and integrated air defense networks, a modern blue water 
navy, fifth generation fighter jets, and an array of anti-ship ballistic missiles.9 Commercial 
                                                 
7 Brose, The Kill Chain, 12–13. 
8 Sean Kennedy, “Congress Is Ultimately to Blame for F-35 Fiasco,” Air Force Times, March 2, 2020, 
https://www.airforcetimes.com/opinion/commentary/2020/03/02/congress-is-ultimately-to-blame-for-f-35-
fiasco/. 
9 Brose, The Kill Chain, 31–36. 
4 
developments can also lead to an unexpected degradation of the capability of a platform 
before it becomes operational. Such was the case in 2018, when the stealth capability of 
the F-35 was called into question by a German sensor manufacturer. The manufacturer 
provided evidence that its newly developed passive radar had identified and tracked a pair 
of F-35s during the Berlin Air Show.10 Despite millions of man hours of work and almost 
a half-trillion dollars in development, the F-35’s stealth technology may already be 
obsolete.  
This all being said, there is little debate that advanced technologies have benefited 
those who employ them properly. The machine gun, airplane, aircraft carrier, guided 
missile, and nuclear weapons have all left indelible marks in history. Additionally, it is 
absurd to think that a society should not continue to develop technology. As the Aztecs 
discovered with the arrival of the Conquistadors, spears and clubs are no match for 
gunpowder and cannons.11  
Overall though, this technological avenue seems unlikely to be the panacea that its 
proponents prophesize it to be. It seems improbable to believe that adversaries will cease 
developing capabilities, platforms, and technologies at a pace on par with U.S. 
development. To use the Chinese for another example, they have publicly stated their plan 
to field a fully modernized world-class military by 2049.12 This military is ostensibly 
designed to defend Chinese goals and specifically limit American opposition to those goals. 
This developmental reality infers that the current impasse between adversary Anti-access/ 
Area Denial capabilities and U.S. conventional deterrence and coercion capabilities is 
likely to remain in the future.  
                                                 
10 Brose, 167. 
11 Derek Leebaert, To Dare and to Conquer: Special Operations and the Destiny of Nations, from 
Achilles to Al Qaeda (New York: Back Bay Books, 2007), 154–71. 
12 “A ‘World-Class’ Military: Assessing China’s Global Military Ambitions,” U.S.-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission (testimony of Taylor Fravel, Massachussets Institute of Technology), 
June 20, 2019, 15. 
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B. THE PROPOSITION 
How then can the U.S. affect, particularly kinetically affect, its adversaries in order 
to maintain capable deterrence and particularly coercion? Further, how can the U.S. ensure 
it can continue to effectively impose costs on these states while staying below the threshold 
of retaliation? Last, in the event of conflict, what tools exist to levy costs while minimizing 
the risk of undesired escalation?  This research argues that an unintended benefit of the 
current high-tech approach is that, while the U.S. and its adversaries focus on 
modernization and next generation capabilities, older lower tech capabilities are being 
forgotten or ignored. This forgetfulness, particularly in defending against low-tech 
capabilities, has opened an alternative, or sub-conventional, space within which to conduct 
activities. Specifically, what seems to be overlooked, in this modern high-tech arms race, 
is that the base infrastructure necessary for using advanced technology, and for maintaining 
human societies writ large, remains largely unimproved. The Trans-Siberian railroad, for 
example, was first laid down in 1891 and remains the primary means of logistics movement 
across Russia.13 Planes continue to need runways, ships need ports, missiles require fuel, 
and most important, all of these technologies require access to energy and logistics.  
If infrastructure supporting adversaries is damaged or destroyed, it directly affects 
their ability to employ forces, capabilities, and technology. Importantly, this critical 
infrastructure is often overlooked and, in many cases such as an electrical grid or road 
system, is too large to be effectively guarded.14 Perhaps, in looking for ways to levy 
physical costs on bellicose states, the United States should look, not only, at future 
conventional technological advances but also at more covert capabilities, such as sabotage, 
that provided asymmetric parity prior to the United States’ ascension to hegemony. 
Importantly, while advanced capabilities are being developed, the technology to conduct 
physical sabotage exists now. It may offer an alternative option that adversaries, who are 
also focusing on high-tech capabilities, likely do not expect and are not prepared to counter. 
                                                 
13 EY, “Russian Infrastructure in the Global Context,” 2014, 
https://ru.investinrussia.com/data/files/sectors/EY-russia-infrastructure-survey-2014-eng.pdf. 
14 Paul W Parfomak, “Physical Security of the U.S. Power Grid: High-Voltage Transformer 
Substations,” CRS report R43604 (Washington: Congressional Research Service, June 17, 2014). 
6 
To this point then, does sabotage, as part of a comprehensive deterrence and compellence 
strategy, remain a viable option to deter, deny, and coerce revisionist states while managing 
escalation concerns? Furthermore, should the United States look to reinvigorate its 
sabotage programs as a means to affect aggressor states? The research presented below 
examines these questions. 
7 
II. FRAMEWORK OF RESEARCH 
A. SABOTAGE DEFINITION 
The current general definition of sabotage is a deliberate action aimed at weakening 
a polity through subversion, obstruction, disruption or destruction.15 This definition is 
extremely broad. It covers an enormous spectrum of acts. Anything from slashing tires or 
purposefully working inefficiently to covert attacks on nuclear facilities fits this definition. 
This thesis is not interested in acts of simple sabotage that are generally opportunistic in 
nature and require little training or planning.16 Rather this thesis looks at coup de main17 
sabotage acts conducted as part of a campaign against state-controlled infrastructure that 
require trained operatives and detailed planning prior to execution.18 These sabotage acts 
are kinetic in nature and are for the purposes of supporting an operational or strategic goal. 
Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 550–104 provides a definition that is more 
specific than the general definition. DA PAM 550-104 defines strategic sabotage as direct 
action19 by specially trained units against such key targets as factories and military 
installations.20 This is the definition this thesis uses when discussing sabotage.  
B. APPROACH 
This thesis explores a series of historical case studies. Looking at past examples 
and studying the effects of previous sabotage operations provide a venue through which to 
                                                 
15 Joint Special Operations University, Special Operations Research Topics (MacDill AFB FL: The 
JSOU Press, 2019), 3. 
16 Office of Strategic Services, Simple Sabotage Field Manual, 1st ed. (Washington DC: OSS, 1944), 
1. 
17 The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms definition of coup de main is: “An offensive 
operation that capitalizes on surprise and simultaneous execution of supporting operations to achieve success 
in one swift stroke.”  
18 Office of Strategic Services, Simple Sabotage Field Manual, 1. 
19 The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms definition of direct action is: “Short duration 
strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or 
diplomatically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, 
capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets.”  
20 Andrew Molnar, Jerry Tinker, and John LeNoir, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in 
Insurgencies, (Special Operations Research Office Department of the Army, 1965), 220. 
8 
postulate future potentialities. Historic case study analysis allows for the examination of 
the conditions and context prior to an act of sabotage; the general cost to the attacker; the 
cost to the victim; and the effect on critical capabilities. Finally, historic case studies are 
easily accessible for research. Any information on planned or current acts of sabotage are 
understandably inaccessible due to the required sensitivity and secrecy surrounding 
sabotage. 
This research focuses on three sabotage campaigns that occurred between 1900 and 
the present: Lawrence of Arabia’s campaign against the Medina Railroad (World War 
One), the Greek Guerrilla’s campaign against Axis occupation (World War Two), and the 
Weather Underground’s campaign against the U.S. government (Cold War). During this 
period, saboteurs operated under many of the same conditions and against industrial 
infrastructure that is similar to what is still in use today.21 While there are myriad examples 
of sabotage operations particularly during World War One and World War Two, the chosen 
case studies are specific campaigns that include multiple operations over time. These 
campaigns are important to examine diachronically as they highlight sabotage effects and 
the reactions to them. Furthermore, they show sabotage in a multi-polar environment, not 
dissimilar to current and likely future international conditions. With a return to multi-
polarity, it is important to understand how and why previous governments and 
organizations planned for and executed these covert acts against their competitors. The 
thorough study of World Wars One and Two by academics and historians also enables a 
depth of analysis and access to information that is not necessarily available with other 
conflicts. Acts, or planned acts, of sabotage during the Cold War period and the post-9/11 
world are more difficult to study, due to many operations remaining classified or unverified 
by the perpetrators and victims. The evidence that does exist however, such as the 
Mitrokhin files, which outlines Russia’s plan to cripple Canadian and American gas and 
                                                 
21 Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 2004), 40–41. 
9 
electric infrastructure, are incredibly valuable for presenting contemporary planning 
against interstate competitors.22  
C. CASE STUDY SELECTION CRITERIA  
This thesis looks at sabotage campaigns sponsored by state actors. This means an 
act of sabotage conducted either unilaterally, or through a proxy, for the purpose of 
supporting the national goals and objectives of the sponsoring state. This eliminates 
sabotage campaigns conducted by organizations not tied to state powers, such as the Earth 
Liberation Front.23  While these acts of sabotage are destructive, and often effective, they 
are not tied to a state goal and thus are not helpful in examining interstate competition. 
Additionally, these acts of non-state sabotage are unlikely to provoke a retaliatory response 
by the affected state against another state. Case study selection further focuses on those 
sabotage campaigns conducted by a state against a near-peer competitor. This is important 
as it shows the use of sabotage in a multi-polar setting versus a more powerful state acting 
against a weaker polity. Furthermore, by examining campaigns rather than individual acts 
it is possible to observe the impact of sabotage over time against a competitor and identify 
its potential value as part of a larger strategy.  
D. THEORY ON ESCALATION CONTROL 
This thesis utilizes the theory of covert interaction, developed by Austin Carson for 
discussing escalation control.24 Carson’s theory argues that states conduct covert 
intervention as a means to both control escalation and limit the scope of a conflict. He 
specifically argues that covert intervention in a conflict, by a third-party state, enables 
backstage escalation control that avoids both external influence and domestic pressure. He 
                                                 
22 Churchill College “Mitrokhin’s KGB Archive Opens ” July 7, 2014, 
https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/news/2014/jul/7/mitrokhins-kgb-archive-opens/. 
23 Gary A. Ackerman, “Beyond Arson? A Threat Assessment of The Earth Liberation Front,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 4 (October 2003): 143–70, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550390449935. 
24 Austin M. Carson, Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2018), 11. 
10 
further argues that often the attacked state will hide knowledge of the intervention or even 
collude with the intervening state in order to enable its own goals in the conflict. 
A key example of this is the Soviet intervention during the Korean War. The United 
States and the Soviet Union actively colluded to limit escalation during the conflict. Stalin, 
the leader of the USSR, sought ways to limit American and UN efforts against North Korea. 
Stalin feared that, following MacArthur’s successful landings at Inchon in 1950, North 
Korean forces could be driven out of the Korean Peninsula.25 This would likely escalate 
the war from a limited war on the peninsula to a regional or even global war that would 
directly impact the Soviet Union. During the 1950s, Stalin was working to consolidate 
Soviet power following World War Two. If the Korean War had expanded beyond the 
peninsula, domestic pressure from Soviet hawks would likely demand overt involvement 
in the conflict. This would entail direct aggression against the United States, dramatically 
escalating the conflict and threatening Stalin’s consolidation efforts. In response to this 
concern, Stalin covertly deployed 40,000 – 70,000 Soviet troops to support North Korean 
aerial and air defense operations between 1950 and 1953.26 The bulk of North Korean air 
and anti-air operations, up to 90 percent at times, were conducted, not by North Koreans 
or Chinese soldiers, but rather Soviet pilots and anti-aircraft gunners.27 Stalin covertly 
employed these troops as a means of signaling to the United States the Soviet desire to 
limit the war to just the Korean Peninsula. The Soviets sought to stymie U.S. and UN 
operations in hopes they would seek a negotiated settlement to the conflict rather than the 
overall surrender of North Korea or, worse, expansion of the war.  
American intelligence quickly detected Soviet involvement in Korea. At the highest 
levels of government the United State, to include President Truman himself, actively 
worked to ensure Soviet involvement did not become public for reasons similar to Stalin.28 
If Soviet involvement in Korea became public knowledge, hawkish domestic pressure, 
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from individuals like Senator Joseph McCarthy, would weaponize the information and 
likely demand the U.S. declare war on the Soviet Union. This was at a time when the U.S. 
Government was actively attempting to avoid war with the USSR. By not publicly 
releasing this information, the U.S. signaled to the USSR that it had limited goals on the 
Korean peninsula. This signaling and subsequent collusion on both sides enabled backstage 
communications between the two countries that were not impacted by domestic pressure 
on either side. John Gaddis famously sums the interaction up:  
the Soviet Union never publicized its involvement in these air battles, and 
the United States, which was well aware of it, chose not to do so either. The 
two superpowers had found it necessary but also dangerous to be in combat 
with one another. They tacitly agreed, therefore, on a cover-up.29  
Another more recent example is the Iranian intervention following the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq. This resulted in a similar collusion as U.S. leaders sought to limit the 
scope of the war and Iran signaled that it was against any expansion of operations. During 
the 2000s there was no intent from any American administration to actively fight Iran. This 
is despite immense domestic pressure, particularly from right-wing political hawks. Iran, 
meanwhile, sought to ensure America did not attempt to expand the war into its territories. 
This costly covert signaling on Iran’s part helped to limit any overt expansion of the War 
on Terror into a regional war against Iran.30  
E. FOLLOW ON 
Following case study analysis, this thesis will identify whether conditions that 
existed during the time of these acts, specifically infrastructure vulnerability, continue to 
exist. Additionally, this section will investigate and identify best practices behind these 
coup de main sabotage activities. This enquiry also identifies the risk management and 
mitigation that planners and decision makers conducted prior to executing strategic 
sabotage against competitors. This identification of best practices, risk management and 
risk mitigation are vital to understanding whether acts of sabotage as a costly signaling and 
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escalation control measure remain viable in the modern world. Lastly, the thesis will 
provide recommendations for follow on study. 
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III. LITERATURE AND CASE STUDIES 
A. A DEARTH OF LITERATURE 
There is very little academic literature specifically on sabotage. A quick search for 
counterinsurgency or nuclear proliferation will bring up thousands of articles and books on 
either topic. No such repository exists for sabotage. This dearth of literature is confounding 
due to the impact sabotage has had on previous military campaigns. Sabotage and covert 
infrastructure attack are so important from a strategic prospective that John Arquilla, a 
foremost expert in irregular warfare, listed it as one of the five key tenets in a successful 
military campaign. Arquilla points out that throughout history, adept leaders such as Robert 
Rogers, Nathan Bedford Forrest, Denis Davydov, Christiaan De Wet, and T.E. Lawrence 
have all used sabotage as a means to accomplish strategic goals. Arquilla also cogently 
points out that sabotage and infrastructure attack, as a strategic tool, has greatly waned in 
recent decades and posits that a “fundamental rethinking of the concept” is in order.31  
What remaining academic discussions exist generally lump sabotage in with other 
forms of covert action, specifically espionage. This lumping is problematic. Covert action 
covers a large spectrum of activities. Studying it as a broad category vice its individual 
parts leads to findings that may be accurate for one activity but inaccurate for other 
activities. For example, Michael Joseph and Michael Poznansky, writing for The Journal 
of Peace Research in 2017, argue that covert action, such as that seen during the Cold War, 
is dead due to modern telecommunications.32 They postulate a model that argues modern 
covert action is largely unviable because the risk of exposure is too high due to the prolific 
spread of information technology. They point to Russia’s use of “little green men” in 
Ukraine as proof that, in the information age, it is nearly impossible to hide a government’s 
involvement in subversive activities. This inability to hide activities then leads 
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governments to choose either overt action or no action at all.33 Their model, however, 
focuses solely on subversion and obstruction of civil activities as covert action, with no 
mention of sabotage. Subversion and obstruction of civil action often require direct or near-
direct involvement with the population. This involvement with the population gives 
credible justification to their argument that the increase in information communication 
technology will lead to an increased likelihood of covert action being found out. This 
model’s focus on interactions with the population, and concerns about media discovery, 
fails however, to account for the targeted destruction of infrastructure, which does not 
necessarily involve engagement with the population. This is particularly true when 
sabotage is used against critical infrastructure, such as weapons facilities, logistics routes, 
or electrical production, which are often situated away from population centers  
While academic literature is sparse at best, there are multiple declassified technical 
documents for practitioners. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a precursor to the 
Central Intelligence Agency, published the seminal work on sabotage in 1944. Titled the 
Simple Sabotage Field Manual, this manual provides ideas for basic acts that saboteurs can 
take to disrupt systems. These ideas include both outright destruction of equipment as well 
as encouraging faulty decision-making which results in accidents and delays. Owing to the 
fact that many of the manual’s techniques continue to remain viable, the CIA did not 
declassify it until 2008.34 Additionally, In the 1950s and 60s the Operations Research 
Office of the Department of the Army, in association with the Johns Hopkins University, 
published several papers on the viability and usefulness of sabotage against near-peer 
competitors. Their paper on incendiarism specifically noted that arson by saboteurs was 
not only viable but also enabled a small force to have oversized effects on a target. Their 
research pointed out that fire, and the water necessary to extinguish it, caused more damage 
than high explosives, such as conventional bombs.35 In 1965, the Special Operations 
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Research Office at the American University, under contract for the Department of the 
Army, published Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies. While 
not ostensibly a sabotage manual, this paper, also known as DA PAM 550-104, spends a 
great deal of time outlining the benefits of sabotage. DA PAM 550-104 goes so far as to 
describe sabotage as a principal activity necessary for degrading an enemy’s war 
capabilities.36  
B. A RELIANCE ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE BEGINNINGS OF 
MODERN SABOTAGE 
Concerns about infrastructure are not new. In 97 BCE, The Roman Civil Engineer 
Frontinus wrote extensively about defending Rome’s aqueducts from sabotage.37 These 
aqueducts were the strategic means by which Rome ensured water to its people. Any 
disruption of the water flow would have had catastrophic effects on the city. In addition to 
the aqueducts, the Romans built extensive infrastructure to support the logistics needs of 
their empire. They built more than 10,000 miles of road, connected to ports, throughout 
their empire that enabled their bureaucracy and allowed the Legions to reposition and 
resupply faster than any of their competitors.38 The control of these logistics routes and 
nodes had strategic implications. For instance, during the Roman civil war, the port of 
Methone served as a critical logistics node for Antony’s forces in Greece. Understanding 
the strategic importance of the port, the Roman General Agrippa conducted a daring 
surprise amphibious assault against the port and seized it in 31 BCE. The loss of Methone 
meant that Antony could no longer resupply his army from his logistics base in Egypt. 
Forced to live off the barren hillsides of Greece, Antony’s army languished and was soon 
defeated at Actium. While not an act of sabotage, the loss of Methone highlights the 
importance of critical infrastructure throughout history.39  
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The advent of all-weather road surfaces, railroads, and industrialization in the 1800s 
dramatically increased countries’ reliance on large scale infrastructure for their success. 
Prior to the industrial revolution, campaigning armies had two choices: restrict their 
movements to nearby navigable waterways for resupply or rely on living off the land.40 
This naturally limited campaign capabilities and objectives by restricting the amount of 
resources available to a military. With the beginnings of reliable road and rail networks in 
addition to viable waterways, countries were now able to rapidly bring the full might of 
their national power against another nation. This growth in capability was remarkable and 
unprecedented.  
In 1900, it took less than 24 hours to travel between Rome and Cologne, a trip that 
took 67 days during the Roman period.41 However, this does not fully encapsulate the 
rapidity of infrastructure development. For a better comparison, examine the difference 
between the Peninsula Campaign against Napoleon in 1804 and the Austro-Prussian War 
in 1866. During the Peninsula Campaign, the Duke of Wellington’s primary form of 
logistics and sustainment was cattle, in the form of bullocks and oxen. Wellington wrote 
that procurement of cattle, and food for them, was a primary concern of his, without which 
he could not fight. This need to maintain the cattle restricted Wellington’s military 
movements to roughly twenty miles a day and directly impacted his options for action 
against Napoleon.42  Sixty-two years later, Prussia, in the span of just seven days, deployed 
its entire Guard Corps of over 200,000 soldiers, with all their horses and equipment, from 
Berlin to Austria using railroads. Never before had a country accomplished such a feat, and 
it was crucial to the Prussian victory over Austria.43  Where before armies had lived off 
the land or been slowly resupplied with pack animals and supply ships, now men, weapons, 
and equipment could be shipped directly from industrial centers and, as Keegan writes, 
“decanted on to the field of battle.”44 Historian A.P. Taylor went so far as to argue, in his 
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seminal work War by Timetable, that the rapid mobilization capabilities of railroads 
inadvertently caused the brutality of World War One.45 
This growth in infrastructure enabled, and still enables, countries to accomplish 
things that were previously thought impossible. It allowed states to conduct operations at 
speed and to rapidly react or deploy military force. Coupled with the industrial revolution, 
the destructive capabilities of nation states grew dramatically. So too, however, did the 
requirements to sustain and employ these capabilities. Military machinery and units grew 
deadlier, but they also grew larger, and more complex, and required increased 
infrastructure and logistics to maintain them. New requirements now existed to maintain, 
and secure infrastructure in order to enable and sustain these complex military capabilities. 
Many countries, such as Germany, went so far as to nationalize their rail and telegraph 
infrastructure to ensure it was managed and maintained for military support.46 This all 
meant that increased technological capability went hand in hand with increased 
technological dependency.  
Belligerents also immediately noticed that while infrastructure was a huge benefit, 
it was also a weakness. If a nation could damage its enemy’s infrastructure, it might be able 
to prevent its enemy from properly employing its forces. This became a goal of competing 
states. In November 1864 for example, Confederate saboteurs, stationed in Canada, 
infiltrated New York City, and set a series of fires designed to destroy the city. New York 
City was the central hub for Union logistics. Losing the port and rail yards would have 
crippled Union forces in the field who relied on regular resupply. The saboteurs, however, 
failed to properly fuel their blazes. The fires were quickly discovered and put out.47 By the 
early 1900s, multiple leaders, writers, and thinkers were positing the potential of coup de 
main sabotage and the impacts it could have on states. Joseph Conrad’s The Secret Agent 
and G.K. Chesterton’s The Napoleon of Notting Hill remain famous works of the era that 
focus specifically on espionage and sabotage. During a 1911 war scare, Winston Churchill, 
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then the Home Secretary, was so concerned that a handful of German saboteurs could blow 
up Britain’s naval cordite reserves that he ordered Royal Marines to guard the stockpiles.48 
History however could be even stranger than fiction. In 1916, at the height of World 
War One, German saboteurs targeted Black Tom Island in New York Harbor. The United 
States had not entered the conflict yet and remained a neutral country. Factories in the 
United States openly manufactured and sold arms and ammunition to the European powers. 
Much of the ammunition was stored on Black Tom Island before being transported by ship 
to Europe. On July 30, 1916, German saboteurs lit several fires on Black Tom island where 
more than fifty tons of TNT and a thousand tons of ammunition were awaiting shipment to 
France and Britain.49 The fires set the ammunition and explosives ablaze. The resulting 
explosion tore apart the ammunition stockpile in New York Harbor and is considered one 
of the largest non-nuclear explosions in history. The resulting blast was felt as far away as 
Philadelphia. The shockwave was so violent it killed at least four people including a ten-
month-old child who was across the harbor in New Jersey. The majority of the windows in 
Lower Manhattan and Brooklyn were shattered. The Statue of Liberty was damaged so 
badly that parts of the statue remain closed to the public today because of the blast. Lastly, 
the fires were so intense they forced the evacuation of Ellis Island. The saboteur’s simple 
arson did more than half a billion dollars in damage and directly affected British, French, 
and Russian wartime capabilities by destroying the munitions. It took years for American 
authorities to conclude that German saboteurs were behind the attack. Initial investigations 
believed that carelessness of the railroad company and the security guards at the site were 
the reason for the explosion.50   
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Figure 1. Front Page of the Evening Public Ledger Following Black Tom 
Explosion51 
                                                 




Black Tom Island was completely destroyed by sabotage. The structures in pink were 
destroyed in explosions. The structures in yellow were destroyed in the subsequent 
fires following the explosions. 
Figure 2. Map of Black Tom Island Highlighting Sabotage Damage52 
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Specific sites of scientific relevance were likewise vulnerable. Prior to America 
entering World War Two, the British strategy for defeating Germany relied on four pillars: 
blockading, bombing, subversive activity, and propaganda.53 A full quarter of the British 
national strategy relied on subversive activity, namely sabotage and support to resistance 
fighters. A key front for the British was Norway, which lies directly across the North Sea 
from the United Kingdom. It was here that the British and Norwegians famously conducted 
a series of sabotage attacks against the Vemork Hydroelectric Plant. The Vemork plant 
produced heavy water, as a byproduct of power generation, and was crucial to Nazi 
Germany’s nuclear program. Despite allied attempts to use overt force, in the form of 
bombing raids, they were unsuccessful in damaging the Nazis’ heavy water production. 
Using small teams of saboteurs, however, the British and Norwegians were able to 
successfully end Nazi Germany’s heavy water production in Norway. These sabotage 
actions culminated in two separate actions one year apart. The first, in February 1943, 
destroyed the heavy water production tanks inside the Vemork plant. This temporarily 
disabled Germany’s ability to produce heavy water at the plant and resulted in 3,000 
German soldiers being dispatched to the Vemork plant to search for the saboteurs, who 
were never found. The second sabotage action in February 1944, sank the ferry, SF Hydro, 
on Lake Tinn in Norway. The SF Hydro was carrying the remaining heavy water from 
Vemork, along with a contingent of German soldiers and a number of civilian passengers. 
A Norwegian team attached plastic explosives on a timer to the keel of the SF Hydro, which 
exploded as the ferry was crossing the lake. These sabotage actions effectively delayed 
Nazi Germany’s nuclear program without forcing the allies to conduct an overt invasion of 
Norway and commit large sums of military men and equipment, which were in short 
supply.54  
While none of the sabotage acts highlighted resulted in a cessation of hostilities, 
they do show the importance of infrastructure to modern militaries and the impact that 
                                                 
53 Peter Paret, Gordon Alexander Craig, and Felix Gilbert, eds., Makers of Modern Strategy: From 
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton Paperbacks (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 
684. 
54 M.R.D Foot, SOE: An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive 1940-46, 1st ed. 
(London, British Broadcasting Corporation, 1984). 
22 
sabotage can have on strategic plans. This reliance on infrastructure to support logistics for 
military options, in particular interstate deterrence, coercion, and competition, has only 
grown since 1900. This is directly related to the proliferation of advanced military 
equipment that requires extensive support to function.55  The relationship between logistics 
and combat forces is known as the Tooth to Tail Ratio (T3R). The tooth refers to combat 
forces, while the tail refers to supporting functions that enable combat forces.56 In the U.S. 
military the T3R has grown 35 percent in favor of the tail over the tooth since World War 
One. In World War One, the T3R was 60:40, meaning 60 percent of U.S. capabilities were 
combat related and 40 percent were dedicated to logistics. In Iraq in 2005, the T3R was 
25:75. Only 25 percent of all U.S. capabilities were combat related while 75 percent 
supported logistics.57 Similar ratios can be assumed for other modern states that employ 
comparable capabilities. Interesting and concerning is the reality that infrastructure 
development has not kept up with this demand. Both the U.S. and China, as examples, have 
limited redundancy in their logistics support infrastructure.58 This quite simply means that 
now, more than ever, effects to infrastructure have outsized effects on the ability to employ, 
maintain, and sustain the conventional deterrent and coercion capabilities utilized by 
adversaries.  
The following three case studies build on this argument along with the previous 
theory of covert interaction. The case studies look at the effects that sabotage campaigns, 
more so than just single acts, can have on belligerent states and how that effect can limit 
escalation.         
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C. CASE STUDY #1 TRAIN PIRATES: LAWRENCE OF ARABIA AND THE 
ARAB REVOLT 
I touched off under the first driving wheel of the first locomotive, and the 
explosion was terrific… When I peered through the dust and steam of the 
explosion the whole boiler of the first engine seemed to be missing  
—T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom59 
 
1. Introduction 
World War One was a war of empires.60 The main belligerents, the British Empire, 
France, Germany, Austro-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia focused much of their 
efforts on butchering each other en masse on the plains and mountains of Europe. However, 
these empires did not forget about their colonies and just as importantly the colonies of 
their enemies. Colonial holdings presented vulnerable secondary fronts and sources of 
resources. These far-flung outposts of European power presented opportunities for the 
belligerents to cause increased damage to their enemies while hopefully avoiding the 
trenched stalemates of Europe. In the South Atlantic, warships blasted each other apart 
over the Falkland Islands.61 German, British, South African, Portuguese, and French forces 
spent years fighting a guerrilla-style war amongst the malaria-ridden jungles of East 
Africa.62 Even a country as remote as New Zealand was not immune to conflict on its 
shores. In 1917, the German Officer Felix von Luckner conducted a number of successful 
acts of piracy before being captured by the government of New Zealand. In one of the 
odder acts of the war, he subsequently escaped, stole a sailboat and led authorities on a low 
speed chase for a thousand miles through the South Pacific.63  
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First, though, among these ancillary fronts was the Middle East. Located 
geographically between Europe, Africa and Asia, the region continues to be strategically 
important. During WW1, the region represented the frontier between the Ottoman and 
British Empires. The British, largely ensconced in Egypt and the Persian Gulf, sought to 
drive the Ottomans from the region in hopes that the Ottomans would sue for peace and 
cease support to the Germans. Further, driving the Ottomans from the region would better 
secure the access route to Britain’s key colony, India. For the Ottomans, maintaining 
control of the region was key to maintaining their empire: it allowed them to threaten 
British shipping and diverted key resources and manpower that the British could not then 
employ in Europe. 
It was here that one of the war’s most well-known figures, TE Lawrence or, as he 
is better known, Lawrence of Arabia, earned his fame. Lawrence served as a British liaison 
officer to the Arab irregular forces operating against the Ottomans. Working through his 
Arab partners, Lawrence fought a mobile guerrilla campaign from the Hejaz region of 
Saudi Arabia through what is now Jordan to the Syrian capital of Damascus. His campaign 
was not one solely of sabotage. The Arabs he worked with conducted raids, reconnaissance 
in force, and even large-scale maneuver warfare, most famously wresting the city of Aqaba 
from Ottoman hands. This case study however focuses on Lawrence’s and his Arab 
partners’, main activity: logistics sabotage against the Ottoman rail system. These acts of 
sabotage hamstrung the Ottoman garrisons throughout the region, forcing them to employ 
large numbers of personnel and equipment to protect and repair the vital rail lines. These 
acts further deprived the Ottoman forces of key resources and restricted their ability to sally 
forth to either subdue the Arabs or fight the British forces maneuvering from Egypt. 
Importantly, this sabotage campaign shows that, even in time of outright war against a peer 
competitor, sabotage served as a way to manage escalation, impose costs, and deny 
resources while simultaneously preserving friendly combat power.64  
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2. Background 
The Middle East and its Arab populations had spent several hundred years under 
the authority and control of the Ottoman Empire based in Constantinople, now Istanbul. At 
its zenith, the Ottoman Empire stretched from Poland to Cairo and the Persian Gulf, but by 
1914 ,the empire was in decline.65 Its span of control at the start of World War One 
included the Middle East through Turkey and what are now the countries of Armenia, 
Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Ottomans, having lost a war in the Balkans and failed to stop 
the Italian invasion of Libya between 1911 and 1912, had initiated massive reforms to 
stabilize their territory but remained an inferior organization compared to their European 
counterparts.66 Additionally, while ruled by ethnic Turks, the empire was a multi-ethnic 
consortium whose dispossessed groups were not unaware of the empire’s decaying power.  
As early as the summer of 1908, Sharif Hussein, the man who would lead the Arab 
Revolt, approached the British to gain external support for the Arabs of the Hejaz, the 
western-most province of Saudi Arabia, which includes the cities of Mecca and Medina.67 
Sharif Hussein was the leader of the Hejaz and, while he was appointed by and subject to 
the Ottomans, he ruled fairly autonomously because of the aforementioned Ottoman 
inefficiency. He was concerned that Ottoman reforms, in particular the completion of the 
train line between Constantinople and Mecca, would result in more centralized control and 
erode the power he exercised in his fiefdom.68 He viewed British support to his fiefdom as 
a way to maintain control and temper Ottoman efforts to renew their authority in the region. 
Further, if the Ottoman Empire were to collapse, Hussein had ideas for an Arab empire that 
stretched from Asia Minor to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Initially, his overtures to 
the British were refused. The British did not want to upset another Great Power in the 
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region. However, the onset of war in 1914, and the subsequent entry of the Ottomans on 
Germany’s side, changed Britain’s view on the matter.69  
Britain faced a formidable combat power issue at the start of the war. Its main effort 
was the defeat of Germany in mainland Europe. In order to do this, it needed to maintain 
control of critical exterior lines of communication and resource nodes far from the British 
Isles. Britain needed secure access to India, where much of its material and manpower 
came from, as well as to the commonwealth countries of Australia and New Zealand. It 
needed to maintain the flow of oil from its holdings in southern Iraq and critical to both of 
these it needed to ensure control of the Suez Canal.70 The Suez Canal enabled the British 
to access the Eastern Hemisphere without traversing around the entirety of Africa. In order 
to accomplish this, Britain opted to place comparatively small numbers of its forces in 
critical locations, along the Suez Canal and in the Sinai Peninsula. These forces then 
partnered with local forces to conduct economy of force operations that enabled Britain’s 
main effort against Germany. In 1916, when Hussein finally declared his revolt against the 
Ottoman Empire, the British chose to support him as an efficient way to kinetically pressure 
the Ottomans on multiple fronts.71 It was into this context that TE Lawrence seized his 
moment. 
                                                 
69 Karsh and Karsh, “Myth in the Desert, or Not the Great Arab Revolt.” 
70 Strachan, The First World War, 102. 
71 Ministry of Culture and Heritage, “The Arab Revolt, 1916-18 - The Ottoman Empire,” Ministry of 




Figure 3. T.E. Lawrence in 191872 
3. Foundations and Initial Actions 
The Arab Revolt’s start was lackluster. The Arab forces under Sharif Hussein and 
his sons lacked military equipment and were organized chiefly along tribal lines. The 
British, despite having sent assurances that they would support the revolt, were caught flat-
footed when it occurred and unprepared to provide assistance.73 On June 5, 1916, Sharif 
Hussein’s sons Faisal and Abdullah attacked the Ottoman garrison at Medina. After three 
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days of fighting, the Arab force was unable to break the garrison and withdrew to the desert 
to regroup. Despite smarting from an initial failure, Sharif Hussein openly declared his 
revolt on June 10 and attacked the Ottoman garrison in Mecca. Here, his force was 
successful, and the Ottoman garrison quickly capitulated. His son Faisal simultaneously 
attacked the garrison at Jeddah on the Red Sea. Recognizing the importance of Jeddah’s 
port, the British, despite their lack of preparedness, cobbled together a conventional naval 
flotilla to assist in the attack. Jeddah quickly fell to the combined Arab and British forces 
and provided the British with an initial foothold in the Hejaz.74 Following the capture of 
Mecca and Jeddah by Hussein’s forces, the British established a liaison office to coordinate 
intelligence and operations with the Arabs. This again was done as a means to pressure the 
Ottomans along multiple fronts while reserving critical British manpower and equipment 
for major offensives. T.E. Lawrence was assigned as a liaison to the Arabs beginning in 
October of 1916.75   
TE Lawrence was not a traditional military figure. He was a small, slight man with 
an over-sized head. He studied history in college and had worked on an archeology team 
for the British Museum in Mesopotamia. Owing to his diminutive stature, he was initially 
rejected by the Army when he volunteered at the start of the war. However, by 1915, the 
need for manpower in the British Army enabled him to gain a commission and posting to 
Egypt.76 His initial job was as a cartographer for the general staff. After the fall of Jeddah, 
both the British and Arabs seemed unsure how to continue with the revolt. Lawrence 
capitalized on this lull by convincing his superiors to assign him to a fact-finding mission 
to ascertain the status of the Arab rebels in the Hejaz.77   
The British fact-finding mission determined that the Arab Revolt’s issues resonated 
around two key elements. The first was a lack of leadership. Sharif Hussein was an old 
man, and his son, Feisal appeared to be the only other local leader capable of leading the 
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Arab tribesman against the Ottomans. Hussein’s desire that locals lead the revolt was also 
in opposition to the British Army, who favored using an Egyptian and former Ottoman 
Officer, Aziz al Misri, to coalesce the various Arab irregulars into a coherent conventional 
fighting force.78 The Second element was equipment, the Bedouin tribesmen possessed 
little in the way of rifles, machine guns, and artillery.79 Conversely, the Ottoman troops, 
particularly the 12,000-man garrison at Medina, were armed with modern machine guns 
and German artillery.80  
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Figure 4. Arab Cameleers, March 191781 
4. Railway Campaign Overview   
Following his fact-finding mission, Lawrence was assigned to the Arab desk and 
served as the British Liaison to Faisal, a position that garnered Lawrence great fame 
following the war. British attempts to install Aziz al Misri as the leader of the Arab Revolt 
were unsuccessful and Faisal was subsequently chosen to serve as the de facto commander 
of the Arab irregular forces.82 The British hoped that this force would amalgamate into 
something resembling a conventional militia or provincial force, but in reality, it remained 
a consortium of opportunistic tribesmen who entered and left the campaign at will. This 
issue with tribal reliability would plague the British Headquarters throughout their 
campaign in the Middle East. With the number and capability of the Arab force consistently 
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in question, the British had issues accurately planning for their inclusion in operations. This 
led the liaisons, such as Lawrence, who were embedded with the Bedouins to advise their 
partners to conduct attacks against peripheral targets. These attacks against outlying 
garrisons and the railroad were damaging to the Ottomans without spoiling British 
conventional operations.  
Lawrence was an astute advisor to Faisal. He recognized that mobility was the 
Bedouin’s critical strength. He sought to capitalize on this while simultaneously 
denigrating the Ottomans’ key strength: manpower. The Ottomans possessed enormous 
sums of troops, armed with state-of-the-art weapons. The lightly armed camel raiders stood 
little chance against entrenched soldiers with machine guns and artillery. However, as all 
armies throughout history have found, more manpower means more logistics. Lawrence 
recognized that affecting the flow of logistics using the highly mobile camel-borne 
Bedouins would hurt the Ottomans more than any assault he could mount. His task was 
made infinitely easier by the lack of logistics infrastructure in the region. Overland logistics 
was limited due to the hostile terrain and lack of roads. A dearth of ports, along with British 
naval superiority in both the Mediterranean and Red Sea, made seaborne resupply limited. 
Therefore, the bulk of Ottoman logistics traveled along the Hejaz railway, which connected 
Medina to Damascus. The length of the railway, some 820 miles, made securing the 
entirety of it impossible for the Ottoman garrisons. This vital infrastructure presented a 
prime target for Lawrence’s camel raiders. It was a target that played to the Bedouins ability 
to strike quickly and fade into the desert while avoiding massed Ottoman troops.83     
The criticality of railroads cannot be understated. Their strategic importance was 
well documented by the start of World War One. Railroads allowed, the ground 
deployment of supplies, troops, and equipment at speeds and in quantities previously 
unthought of. Military planners proved the importance of the railroad during the American 
Civil War. The North’s access to 30,000 miles of rail, more than the rest of the world 
combined at the time, enabled quartermasters and commanders to reliably supply and 
deploy forces along any front at speeds the confederacy could never match. Further, 
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Northern forces were tasked with ripping up every section of Confederate track they came 
upon which denied Confederate forces reliable access to logistics from southern depots.84 
The Germans viewed railroads as a strategic resource, They nationalized their rail system 
and by 1914, rural German train stations along the frontier with Belgium and France 
featured platforms a mile long. This was done for explicit military reasons. The platform 
length enabled troop trains to disembark an entire division at each stop.85 Between 1825 
and 1900, Europe went from zero to 175,000 miles of train track.86   
The Ottoman Empire was no different. The Hejaz railway was part of a strategic 
rail system that connected the empire. In 1914, an Ottoman citizen only needed to switch 
trains once when traveling between Constantinople and Medina.87 In 1916, when 
Lawrence’s train pirates began their sabotage attacks, the railroad was the critical line of 
communication that connected the far-flung Ottoman outposts to the rest of the Empire. 
Damage to the Hejaz railway delayed and denied vital supplies to Ottoman garrisons, 
which directly impacted their combat capability. Just as importantly, the Ottomans were 
forced to allocate large numbers of forces in an attempt to secure the railroad, which limited 
their ability to conduct offensive operations. Finally, continual repairs were costly and 
meant the reallocation of critical material that could not be used for the Ottoman war 
machine.    
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The Hejaz Railroad is denoted in black. Red lines indicate roads and sea routes. 
Figure 5. Hejaz Region during World War One88 
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Lawrence’s campaign began in earnest in late 1916 and would run until the 
conclusion of hostilities in 1918. To be clear from the start, Lawrence’s plan was not to 
permanently destroy the Hejaz railway, but rather to damage it just enough that the 
Ottomans would repair it.89 It was better to keep the garrisons in the region bottled up and 
neutered through continual sabotage of the rail system, than to deal a decisive blow to their 
logistics infrastructure. If the railroad was fully destroyed, the Ottomans would likely 
abandon their Arabian garrisons and redeploy the troops to other fronts. The garrison at 
Medina was a key concern in this discussion. It consisted of 12,000 Ottomans under the 
competent command of General Fakhri Pasha.90 The withdrawal and subsequent 
redeployment of such a force under a capable leader could spell disaster for the British 
main effort in the Sinai. With this in mind, Lawrence set out to continually break the 
railroad so as to make Ottoman resupply difficult but not untenable.91 
Lawrence’s weapon of choice in this endeavor was dynamite. His preference for, 
and skill with, Alfred Nobel’s invention earned him the nickname “Emir Dynamite” among 
the Bedouins.92 Dynamite’s introduction to warfare was recent and profound. Its stability 
and portability, compared with more traditional nitroglycerin or black powder, enabled 
Lawrence’s small raiding parties to exact a terrible toll on the Hejaz railway.93 The 
lightweight dynamite was quick to emplace and easily turned valuable rail lines into twisted 
hulks. Lawrence and the Bedouin raiders became adept at destroying a rail bridge in such 
a way that it was “scientifically shattered,” as he put it. This meant that while the bridge 
was unusable and unrepairable, it remained standing. This forced the Ottomans to go 
through the time-consuming task of dismantling the bridge before they could replace it.94 
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By Lawrence’s count, he and his Bedouin camel raiders would blow up 79 bridges before 
the war ended.95 
In early spring 1917, the Bedouin forces were conducting a demolition a day on the 
Hejaz Railway.96 July of 1917 marked the highpoint of sabotage operations, with 800 
charges emplaced on the Hejaz Railway.97 In response to these demolitions, General 
Fakhri Pasha installed strong garrisons at every water station along the railroad. He 
believed these garrisons, and their daily patrols, would serve as a deterrent to the railway 
sabotage. Lawrence described Pasha’s defense as “as stupid a defensive as could be 
conceived.”98 The reason for this is that Pasha viewed the Arabs as a conventional force 
seeking to hold and maintain terrain. This view was partially true; the Arabs had seized 
Mecca and a number of small ports along the Hejaz coast. However, along the railway, the 
Arabs were not concerned with holding or seizing terrain. They sought to disrupt Ottoman 
access to it and make Ottoman retention of it expensive in both men and material. By 
spreading out his forces, Pasha only provided more targets for the Bedouins to shoot at. 
Simultaneously, Fakhri Pasha used what had been his maneuver force to secure the railway 
garrisons, thereby losing any ability to sortie from Medina and the railway. He ceded all 
maneuver and the operational tempo to the Arab raiders.  
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The Ottoman garrison at Bijar Nasif. It was located 74 kilometers north of Medina along 
the Hejaz rail line and was typical of Ottoman defenses in the region. 
Figure 6. A Fortified Ottoman Garrison on the Hejaz Rail Line99 
This juxtaposition in strategy is clearly visualized in Lawrence’s first mining 
operation. Lawrence and his raiders observed a rail station guarded by some 390 Ottoman 
soldiers. The Ottomans outnumbered Lawrence’s party in size and equipment, in addition 
to being adequately entrenched in defensive positions around the station. However, this 
superiority meant nothing, as Lawrence’s party had no intention of seizing the station. 
Instead, the Arabs waited until a train pulled into the station. Then, obscuring their 
movements using terrain and darkness, they mined the tracks in both directions. Using a 
pair of obsolete artillery pieces and several machine guns, Lawrence’s raiding party fired 
on the rail station from a hilltop 2,000 meters away. The intent of the fire was two-fold. 
Their first purpose was to damage the station itself; in this they holed the water tank and 
damaged the pump room. The Second and more important purpose was to convince the 
train engineers to flee with the locomotive. In this they were also successful. The 
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locomotive fled south and struck one of Lawrence’s mines, severely damaging both the 
locomotive and the railroad. With the train and the railway sufficiently damaged, the 
raiding party withdrew. Seventy Ottomans were killed or wounded, another thirty were 
captured when some of the more daring Arabs overran an outlying defensive position, and 
rail traffic was held up for three days. In contrast, one Bedouin was slightly wounded.100 
While the Ottomans had succeeded in retaining their position, they had failed to maintain 
the integrity of the train line and their logistics, the common theme throughout the railway 
campaign.  
 
Figure 7. A Bomb Exploding on the Hejaz Rail Line near Deraa101 
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Not every action though went as smoothly as the one described above. In the fall 
of 1917, Lawrence attempted to employ his train pirates against the rail bridges of the 
Yarmuk Valley. He hoped that a successful action would stir local tribes in the valley to 
join the revolt. Lawrence met up with Abd El-Kader Al Jezairi, the grandson of the famous 
Algerian insurgent Abd El-Kader in hopes that his name would further garner support, 
particularly with Algerian exiles in the vicinity of Damascus.102 However, the French 
Intelligence Service believed Al Jezairi was an Ottoman spy and informed Lawrence of 
this. The local Arabs were also suspicious of the Algerian and refused to join up with 
Lawrence’s party. Then one day Al Jezairi unanticipatedly left camp taking any potential 
Algerian support with him.103 Lacking any local support, Lawrence attempted to blow a 
bridge in the valley, but the bulk of the explosives fell over a cliff during a friendly fire 
exchange between two Arab groups. Finally, hoping for a win in the Yarmuk, Lawrence 
and a group of sixty camel raiders used their remaining explosives on a train culvert. They 
blew the charge as a train was passing over the culvert. Unfortunately, Lawrence was 
unaware that the train carried the Commander of the Ottoman 8th Corps and four hundred 
of his best troops.104 While the explosion was successful, destroying both the culvert and 
the two locomotives pulling the train, the Ottomans quickly recovered and counterattacked. 
Lawrence lost a third of his force in the ensuing retreat.105    
5. Effects and Findings 
Many of Lawrence’s operations and activities were left out of this case study. His 
stunning attack on Aqaba, from the desert, defeated the 1,200-man Ottoman garrison at a 
cost of two Arabs killed. His long-range reconnaissance patrols provided critical 
intelligence to Allenby, the British Commander in Egypt. His capture by, and subsequent 
escape from, the Ottomans in Deraa. His defense of the town of Tafileh. His post-war 
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efforts to support Arab nationalism.106 These are just a few of his exploits that were 
ignored in the previous pages. These acts individually are all harrowing and remarkable. 
Together they paint the portrait of an individual who was “an extraordinary warrior 
unlikely to fit in anywhere else.”107These exclusions though were done purposefully, if 
not albeit regrettably, in order to focus sharply on the railway.  
Despite these exclusions, Lawrence’s sabotage campaign against the Hejaz railway 
remains an important case study. The Ottoman soldiers of the Medina Garrison were first 
rate soldiers. Of particular note was their commander, General Fakhri Pasha. Fakhri Pasha 
was a highly skilled conventional commander and is still revered in Turkey as the 
“Defender of Medina.” He had previously served as the Ottoman Commander of Mosul 
and the Deputy Commander of Aleppo. In 1916, with the outbreak of the Arab Revolt, 
Fakhri was personally selected to command the Hejaz Expeditionary Force tasked with 
defending Medina.108 Fakhri Pasha established robust integrated defenses that successfully 
repelled multiple conventional Arab assaults and deterred the British. He held Medina 
through the war. No allied force, British, French, or Arab, set foot inside the city. When 
the Ottoman Empire signed its armistice with the Allies in October of 1918, Fakhri Pasha 
still refused to surrender Medina. Despite, the capitulation of his Empire, Fakhri and his 
troops remained in defense of the holy city. It was not until January of 1919, two months 
after the end of WW1, that Fakhri was arrested by several of his officers, and Medina was 
finally surrendered.109 Fakhri’s ability to retain Medina despite being besieged for over 
two years was a remarkable feat, one for which he and his men remain heroes in their native 
Turkey. 
Fakhri Pasha’s defense however was irrelevant in the grander scope of the conflict. 
Medina held emotional and religious value for the Ottomans who viewed themselves as 
the protectors of Islam, but the city held limited military value. By defending the city 
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Fakhri, and his superiors who encouraged his defense, enabled Lawrence and his camel 
raiders to play to their strength, mobility. The Ottomans provided fixed positions and 
known infrastructure that the Arabs could demolish at will, while fielding very few 
maneuver forces that the Arabs had to contend with. This made the sabotage campaign 
against the Hejaz railway wildly effective at both the operational and strategic levels. 
Despite multiple tactical failures and a partner force that was often fickle and unreliable, 
Lawrence and his fellow liaisons to the Arab Revolt succeeded in their railway sabotage 
campaign. Highly mobile indigenous forces played absolute havoc against the Hejaz 
Railway without causing the Ottomans to abandon the line. This was vital, as it kept the 
12,000-man Ottoman garrison at Medina effectively out of the war for two years. As 
Lawrence described it, the camel raiders worked diligently to “make the maintenance of 
the garrison a shade less difficult than evacuating it.”110 This “bottling up” of such a large 
highly trained conventional force for so long a period is far more remarkable than Fakhri’s 
defense. 
This perhaps is Lawrence’s greatest contribution to the war effort. By breaking the 
railway just enough that the Medina garrison stayed in place, believing it was strategically 
important, Lawrence and his raiders saved untold numbers of troops on both sides. If the 
Medina garrison withdrew to Damascus, it could have assisted in defending either 
Damascus or Jerusalem. This would have resulted in much heavier, and deadlier, fighting 
during General Allenby’s drive from the Sinai. As it happened, Allenby’s troops took very 
light casualties. This may not have been the case if Fakhri, his artillery and his machine 
guns been present. Lawrence, Feisal, and the Bedouin saboteurs definitively won at the 
operational and strategic level, rendering moot the hardship and bravery of their Ottoman 
foes.  
When analyzing this case study using Austin Carson’s theory of covert interaction, 
the railway campaign fails to support the theory. The Ottomans were well aware of British 
and French support to the Arab Revolt. The Ottomans were in open war against the British 
and French. Additionally, the generally overt nature of Lawrence’s sabotage operations 
                                                 
110 Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, 216. 
41 
and the Arab Revolt writ large destroyed any semblance of plausible deniability. As such, 
Lawrence, his Arab partners, and their operations do not appear to have facilitated any 
backstage escalation control discussions between the Ottomans and British.  
The above notwithstanding, the railway sabotage campaign served as an effective 
economy of force operation. Lawrence and his partners in the Arab Revolt required little 
in the way of support and equipment. Their transportation and food were locally procured. 
Some weapons were provided by the British while the bulk were seized from the Ottomans. 
As long as a steady stream of dynamite and mines were provided to Lawrence and his Train 
Pirates, they could continue to affect the strategic Hejaz Railway. They were able to strike 
largely at will against stationary infrastructure. The Ottomans guarding the railway had 
limited means to respond, despite holding the advantage in men, weapons, and equipment.  
6. Conclusion and Future Potentialities   
Several key lessons from the Arab Revolt remain relevant today and for future 
conflicts. First is the benefit of direct advisement. The British HQ in Egypt spent enormous 
effort attempting to coalesce the Arab Revolt into a force beneficial to their overall strategic 
effort against the Ottomans. However, it was not until they established a permanent liaison 
office with the Arab Revolt that they saw progress. Direct, on ground, advisors turned a 
disorderly revolt into a viable, although unconventional, force for shaping operational and 
strategic effects. Second is the precise use of technology. Modern explosives, and access 
to them, were the critical component that made the sabotage campaign work. Proper 
planning for and utilization of technology alongside indigenous forces enabled outsized 
success. Third and most importantly is the continued viability of logistics infrastructure 
sabotage and the incredible effects of it by highly mobile saboteurs.  
Military planners and strategists continue to wrestle with how to deal with this issue 
of securing lines of communication across multiple domains, not just land. German 
maritime raiders wreaked havoc on allied supply lines during both World Wars. The 
Soviets dealt with interrupted lines of communication during their occupation of 
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Afghanistan.111 The United States dealt with it in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In all 
these situations, lightly armed highly mobile saboteurs and attackers used explosives to 
render lines of communication either dangerous or unusable. Unfortunately, in all these 
situations commanders, planners, and strategists responded in generally the same way 
Fakhri Pasha did: by doubling down on securing these lines at the expense of possessing 
robust maneuver forces. Recently, many U.S. and NATO units in Iraq and Afghanistan 
went so far as to require route clearance be conducted before maneuver units could conduct 
operations.  
Assuming then that, for at least the last hundred years, the standard response to 
logistics infrastructure sabotage is to reinforce lines of communication, this provides an 
opportunity for future conflict. In the event of overt conflict, logistics infrastructure 
saboteurs, like the Bedouin raiders, may provide an option to impose kinetic costs on an 
enemy that limits their mobility and efficacy while also potentially lowering the human 
costs of a conflict. Logistics sabotage may also potentially assuage some escalation 
concerns by limiting direct conventional encounters between states in conflict, such as the 
bottling up of the Medina Garrison. Further, logistics infrastructure sabotage may limit the 
ability of a foe to field specific units by forcing them secure key lines of communication. 
While not perfect, Lawrence’s railway sabotage campaign provides proof that sustained 
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D. CASE STUDY #2 THE FOLLOWERS OF HADES: THE GREEK 
GUERRILLAS DURING WORLD WAR TWO 
When lecturing the Haifa sabotage school on this operation later, I staggered 
them by telling them the quantity we used. The same result could have been 
achieved with one-tenth the total charge, but of course we were in the dark 
as to the size of the bridge members until we reached the target. 
—British liaison officer speaking on a Greek viaduct attack112 
 
1. Introduction 
World War Two remains the seminal war in mankind’s history. Never before or 
since has a conflict been so widespread, so all encompassing, and so deadly. Nazi 
Germany, Imperial Japan, and Italy assailed the rest of the world in a bid to establish 
autarkies. Before its end, more than 80 million people would die in battlefields and cities 
worldwide. From Europe to North Africa and the far Pacific, civilians as much as soldiers 
would be the targets of savage attacks, bombing campaigns, starvation, and disease. 
Perhaps most damaging, the conclusion of World War Two would usher in the nuclear era, 
and the world would know the power of atomic weapons.  
While overshadowed by larger campaigns in Europe and the Pacific, Greece played 
an important role in the war. Despite lacking resources, Greece’s geographic location made 
it strategic terrain for any nation attempting to secure the Mediterranean and North Africa. 
Its geography placed Greece squarely in the crosshairs of Italy and Nazi Germany. For four 
years, the Greeks would fight the combined forces of Italy and Germany. After the Greek 
army fell to German blitzkrieg tactics, Greek guerrillas took up the mantle of resistance 
and, supported by British and American commandos, waged a campaign of sabotage and 
destruction that lasted until the Axis withdrawal in 1944.113 These sabotage acts served to 
stymie the flow of critical logistics to German forces in North Africa and effectively tied 
up multiple German divisions. This forced the Divisions to defend lines of communication 
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and rendered them incapable of participating in operations in other theaters. Not unlike 
Lawrence’s campaign in the First World War, the actions of the Greek guerrillas served to 
impose costs, manage escalation and deny resources to an adversary in a critical theater.  
2. Background 
At the outbreak of World War Two, the British, still stinging from the brutal lessons 
of World War One, sought a strategy of peripheral cost imposition against the Nazis based 
on Liddle Hart’s theory of indirect approach. The British strategy consisted of blockades, 
bombings, subversive activities, propaganda, and attacks against outlying German 
territories while avoiding the main German war machine. It was a strategy well suited for 
Britain, which at the time had a small economy and limited manpower for ground forces. 
This peripheral strategy focused on two key locations. The first was Norway, which lies 
directly across the North Sea from the United Kingdom. The second, and equally 
important, was the Mediterranean, which Churchill referred to as “the soft underbelly” of 
the Nazi Regime.114 Disrupting the Nazis the ability to launch attacks from Norway helped 
protect the British Home Islands, while securing the Mediterranean enabled vital supplies 
from the Middle East and India to rapidly reach the European Theater via the Suez 
Canal.115   
This desire to secure the Mediterranean was shared by Nazi Germany and its ally 
Italy for similar reasons. All three nations viewed Greece as a critical position in the 
Mediterranean. The British maintained an alliance with Greece and stationed their 
Mediterranean Fleet there.116 The Italians viewed Greece as a logical addition to their 
Mediterranean holdings. In addition, it would provide agricultural resources, in the form 
of sheep and leather, as well as operational reach into the eastern Mediterranean. 
Conversely, Nazi Germany saw Greece as the quickest logistical route to support their 
operations in North Africa. A line of communication through Greece would enable Nazi 
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Germany to reliably supply Erwin Rommel’s force, while simultaneously hampering 
British access to their beleaguered forces in Egypt.117 
 
Figure 8. Allied Plan to Attack through the Mediterranean118 
3. Foundations and Initial Actions  
Greece’s geography has determined much of its culture and history. Greece 
occupies the southern end of the Balkan Peninsula. Geographically, it is a rugged and 
mountainous landscape that is largely rocky and deforested. In addition to its mountainous 
mainland, almost one fifth of the country’s landmass is made up of islands that surround 
the peninsula. These too are either mountainous or hilly.119 This terrain favors semi-
independent to independent agrarian communities over metropolitan development and 
industrialization. To get a sense of this independence, it is worth noting that in the last 
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election prior to World War Two, sixty political parties were represented at the national 
level.120 These political parties represented local regions, with no party possessing a 
platform capable of spanning the country. These agrarian communities placed an emphasis 
on the meager crops they grew for subsistence and historically lashed out violently against 
any who violated the integrity of their land. This geographic inhibition on large commercial 
and industrial development also affected federal control, and the mass employment of 
modern conventional forces. Instead, the terrain of Greece favored small communities and 
small scale, though violent, independent and unconventional warfare with the fragmented 
Greek City States of antiquity being the capstone example of this.121  
In 1941, owing to its terrain, Greece remained largely undeveloped. The economy 
was agricultural, with 75 percent of its eight million citizens living rurally. Athens and 
Salonika were the only two commercial ports in the country. The economy was agricultural 
with wool, goat hair, and leather being the primary, and most profitable, exports. Fishing 
was important along the coast and islands, though only for local consumption. While there 
was some light industry that served local communities, no heavy industry existed in the 
country. There were few paved roads and only 1,700 miles of narrow-gauge railroad that 
traversed from Belgrade, in Serbia, to the ports at Athens and Salonika.122 For comparison, 
the United States 80 years prior, in 1860, had more than 30,000 miles of railroad.123  
Without seeming to understand this geography or the temperament of the agrarian 
people who occupied it, Mussolini issued an ultimatum, on October 27, 1940, demanding 
the surrender of Greece. When the Greeks refused to comply, he invaded on October 28. 
Despite domestic differences, the Greeks united in support of their small country and 
waged a brutal campaign against the Italians. Although lacking in personnel and equipment 
compared to the Italians, the Greeks succeeded in not only throwing back the Italian 
offensive but also in successfully counterattacking. In the span of three months, the Greeks 
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pushed the Italians out of Greece and seized almost a third of Albania, inflicting more than 
100,000 casualties on the Italians in the process.124   
This Greek success was short lived. On March 1st, 1941, Bulgaria joined the Axis 
Pact, which enabled Germany to drive straight into Greece. Germany required Greek ports 
to support its campaign in North Africa, and Hitler directed his military to succeed where 
his weak Italian ally had failed. Germany invaded, through Bulgaria, on April 6, 1941. 
Britain sent 58,000 troops to support the Greeks, but it was too little, too late. Within three 
weeks German forces had conquered Greece and installed a puppet government. By June 
the Germans had also conquered the island of Crete and effectively gained control of the 
eastern Mediterranean.125  Overall, the situation by late 1941 was bleak for the Allied 
cause. The Germans won every campaign they engaged in. Britain and Russia remained 
the only two European countries openly fighting the Nazis and unfortunately, both these 
fights were defensive in nature. The British were locked in continual air combat fending 
off the German strategic bombing campaign while Russia was defending itself from a 
German ground invasion.126   
With its strategic goal of establishing a line of communication through Greece to 
North Africa accomplished and the invasion of Russia ongoing, Germany could not afford 
to leave valuable frontline troops in Greece. Germany quickly turned over occupation 
duties, and the puppet government, to its Italian allies and withdrew most of its combat 
troops from Greece. What troops the Germans did leave held key points in the country, 
such as the port of Athens-Pireaus, Salonika, western Crete, a portion of Thrace, and some 
of the larger Aegean islands. The railway between Salonika and Athens, while not wholly 
guarded by Germans, was used exclusively to support German logistics traffic to North 
Africa. The rest of the country was left to Italian occupation troops. Italy’s occupation force 
was as successful as its initial offensive against Greece. The puppet government was hated 
by the Greek population. The Italian occupiers were hated even more. The Greeks had 
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defeated the Italians in battle but now, despite that, the Italians possessed the bulk of the 
Greek mainland. What limited effective government activities existed before the 
occupation quickly failed under Italian incompetence. Inflation ran rampant. black markets 
for essential goods became commonplace. Food shortages and starvation, particularly in 
the cities, were the norm rather than the exception.127 
Following Greece’s defeat and occupation, the Greek people were left stunned and 
angered. What remained of the pre-war government fled to British-occupied Egypt. The 
army dissolved and what officers survived fled underground. Hatred for their occupiers ran 
deep, though, and quickly various resistance organizations began to take shape in both the 
cities and countryside. Owing to the aforementioned independent nature of the agrarian 
Greeks, many independent resistance groups developed, often with goals contradictory to 
neighboring groups. Greek Communist Party groups were the first to organize. Prior to the 
war, the Greek government had suppressed the Greek Communist Party, which caused 
them to develop a robust underground network. The Greek communists now used this 
underground to stimulate, coordinate, and organize much of the early resistance activities. 
The growth of the communist resistance galvanized other more conservative organizations, 
led by former Greek officers, to develop into their own resistance movements, and by the 
spring of 1942, the Greek resistance was conducting small-scale guerrilla attacks.128    
In the Summer of 1942, Colonel Zervas, the leader of the EDES, the Greek 
Democratic National League, guerrilla movement conducted the first large scale sabotage 
attack in Greece. This would provide proof of guerrilla capability and usher in the period 
of direct British support. Zervas recognized that disruption of the lines of communication 
would cause far more damage to the Italian garrisons in his region than any direct attack 
he could muster. He identified that where the sole highway between the cities of Ioannina 
and Arta passed over the Louros River, there was a steep defile that all traffic needed to 
pass through. Reconnaissance by the guerrillas identified that Italian logistics convoys 
were lightly guarded and followed a fairly set schedule. On the 23rd of October 1942, 
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Zervas and his men mined the end of the defile, set charges on the bridge, and occupied 
elevated ambush positions along the road. When the Italian convoy, consisting of two 
tanks, a gun truck, a command vehicle, and nineteen supply trucks, drove into the defile on 
the afternoon of 23rd, they were decimated. The lead tank struck a mine and burst into 
flames, blocking the convoy in the defile. Then Zervas’ men blew the bridge behind the 
rear tank effectively trapping the convoy. Greek Guerrillas poured gunfire and dropped 
boulders on the trapped Italians. When the shooting stopped 70 Italians were dead and 23 
vehicles were destroyed, including the two tanks. What supplies the guerrillas couldn’t 
carry out on mules were covered in gasoline and burned. For two weeks following the 
attack, Italian forces combed the countryside, but never captured Zervas or his men.129    
 
Figure 9. EDES Guerrillas and SOE in Greece130 
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4. Proxy Support and Sabotage Campaign   
In accordance with its strategy of peripheral attacks and subversive activity, in 
addition to its long-standing alliance with Greece, Britain allocated forces and equipment 
to support the Greek resistance in late 1942.131 Specifically, the British sought to use the 
Greek guerrillas to impede the flow of logistics from Greece to Germany’s Afrika Corps. 
Under the command of Erwin Rommel, the Afrika Corps had advanced into Egypt and 
were only seventy miles from the British Headquarters in Alexandria.132 The British 
needed Rommel’s supply line cut so they could effectively counterattack. Due to 
commitments elsewhere, a general manpower shortage, and concerns about the ability to 
mount an overt offensive to retake Greece, the British opted to infiltrate commandos to 
support and advise the Greek resistance.  
During the period of darkness between September 30 and October 1, 1942, the 
British attempted to parachute twelve British Commandos, nine officers and three enlisted 
soldiers, into occupied Greece. The infiltration was a calamity. None of the planes found 
their mark. The first group of commandos parachuted over a set of fires that they assumed 
were their signal. The fires turned out to be fires to warm local shepherds and had no 
correlation with the resistance. The second group parachuted into a field and met a member 
of the Greek resistance who had expected a supply drop. He was surprised and unsure what 
to do with the commandos. The last group was unable to find any signals and returned 
home. When they attempted to infiltrate a month later, they again could not find their link 
up signal. They decided to jump blind in the vicinity of their link up point. They 
accidentally landed near an Italian garrison and were forced to immediately evade mortar 
and small arms fire. Despite their inauspicious entry into Greece, none of the British 
advisors were hurt, and they linked up with both the Greek resistance and each other within 
a month of infiltration.133   
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The principal mission of the British Commandos was to destroy any one of the three 
bridges that supported the North-South rail line through Greece. This rail line was the 
primary resupply route for Rommel’s Afrika Corps. At the time, 80 percent of the logistics 
to Rommel flowed along this route. From depots in Eastern Europe, Rommel’s supplies 
moved along the Greek railroad to Athens-Pireaus where they were loaded on boats and 
sent to Crete. From Crete supplies were shuttled nightly to Rommel’s forces in Egypt who 
were in active offensive action against the British 8th Army. While destroying bridges 
behind enemy lines was considered extremely risky, the mission was of strategic value to 
the British. If Rommel’s supply line was interrupted, it would support the British attempt 
to break out of the El Alamein Line.134   
After reconnaissance of the three bridges, the British Commander, Colonel E.C.W. 
Myers, selected the northernmost bridge as the ideal target for sabotage. Referred to as the 
Gorgopotamos viaduct, it was the most accessible of the three, and the Italian garrison that 
defended it seemed incompetent.135 The garrison, with an outpost at either end of the 
viaduct, numbered approximately 80 men.136 Within a month, Col. Myers along with 
several guerrilla leaders, to include Col. Zervas, developed a plan to demolish the viaduct. 
Approximately 150 Greek guerrillas would destroy the Italian outposts guarding each end 
of the viaduct while the British commandos would set charges and demolish it.  
On the night of November 25, 1942, the combined Greek and British contingent 
moved into position around the Gorgopotamos. Colonel Myers set up a temporary 
Command and Control center at the base of the viaduct and waited. At approximately 11:15 
pm, Greek guerrillas began their diversionary assaults on the Italian outposts at either end 
of the bridge. An hour later, and after committing his guerrilla reserves to support heavy 
fighting on the north end of the bridge, Myers ordered the saboteurs to move in and place 
their charges.137 The demolition party laid their charges quickly, the signal to take cover 
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was sounded, and the charges exploded. The first charges cut an eight-foot section of steel 
from the main pier and dropped two one-hundred-foot railway spans into the ravine.138 
Hoping to further foul repairs, Myers ordered another set of charges on the bridge. The 
second explosion rocked the already heavily damaged bridge rendering it completely 
useless. The combined guerrilla force suffered no serious injuries in the destruction of the 
Gorgopotamos. Conversely, the Italians suffered 20 to 30 soldiers killed and all rail 
logistics traveling through Greece were halted for six weeks.139   
Following the events at the Gorgopotamos viaduct, the Greek guerrillas began 
conducting almost incessant sabotage acts. Guerrillas conducted so many operation, to 
include roadblocks, rockslides, and bridge demolitions along the main east-west highway 
through Greece that the Italians were unable to use it between mid-1942 and fall 1943.140 
The guerrillas also employed medieval caltrops, a four-pronged metal form that, when 
thrown, always lands with one point facing up. Caltrops were cheap and easy to make. 
They scattered them along regular Italian and German logistics routes. The frequent stops 
to repair flat tires delayed convoys and wasted axis resources. Additionally, Axis soldiers 
had to leave their vehicles to repair their tires which created opportunities for Greek 
snipers. Lastly, the guerrillas made good use of British concrete covered mines. These 
small mines were strewn along dirt roads where they were indistinguishable from regular 
rocks, and hard to detect with metal detectors. The mines were demoralizing to Italian 
troops who, in unarmored vehicles, were regular casualties.141   
In early May 1943, British Headquarters in Cairo requested that the Allied 
Commandos and Greek guerrillas step up their sabotage campaign. The British hoped 
Greek sabotage would serve as a strategic deception operation. The British hoped that the 
Germans would see an uptick in guerrilla sabotage as a precursor to an allied invasion in 
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the Aegean.142 The Commandos and guerrillas replied with the impressive destruction of 
the Asopos viaduct, the second of the three viaducts supporting the rail line in Greece.  
 
Figure 10. Asopos Viaduct and the Surrounding Terrain in 1943143 
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The Asopos viaduct was a two-hundred-yard-long cantilever bridge that soared 
some two hundred feet above the raging Asopos River. The viaduct was passed over as a 
target in 1942, because of a lack of accessibility. The two main approaches involved 
traveling through train tunnels, which were impossible for either the commandos or 
guerrillas to traverse without being spotted. The third approach was from the east across 
open terrain and was quickly ruled out; the guerrillas estimated they would need 1,000 men 
with heavy weapons to attack from this direction. The final approach, from the west, was 
through a near vertical gorge that was considered impossible to navigate. Additionally, the 
viaduct had a garrison of 40 German soldiers, in strong defensive positions with heavy 
machine guns and search lights. The Germans were better trained and less likely than the 
Italians to panic if attacked. All of this made Asopos viaduct seem impregnable.144  
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Figure 11. Diagram of Asopos Viaduct used by British Commandos145 
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The British, however, disagreed with the Greek assessment, that the western 
approach to Asopos was unnavigable, and in late May conducted a successful 
reconnaissance of the viaduct. On May 21, 1943, six British Commandos made their first 
attempt to fully navigate the western gorge and sabotage Asopos. After two days of 
navigating the gorge, they were forced to turn back when they ran out of rope and were 
unable to descend a waterfall. They stashed their explosives in the gorge and returned to 
camp bruised and battered from the gorge. No additional rope was available in the local 
area. The commandos used 340 feet in the initial attempt, and the operation had to be 
postponed until more rope could be flown in from Egypt.146  
On June 16, now possessing the needed rope, the Commandos set out again to 
destroy the Asopos viaduct. The Commandos arrived at the viaduct on June 19 and realized 
that a German maintenance crew had erected scaffolding and cut a path through the barbed 
wire at the base of the viaduct. These changes were hugely beneficial to the saboteurs, who 
now had direct access to the viaduct’s main pier. As night fell on the 20th of June, the 
Commandos began placing their charges. Charge placement took 90 minutes. At one point, 
a German guard patrolled past the saboteurs. Fearing discovery, a British Commando 
jumped out of a bush, knocked the German unconscious, and threw him off a cliff into the 
Asopos River. Once the charges were set, the Commandos lit 90-minute fuses and beat a 
hasty withdrawal up the gorge. At approximately 2 am, the Asopos viaduct exploded. The 
entire central span of the bridge and both cantilevers collapsed into the gorge.147  
The strategic result of the Asopos sabotage was unexpected and profound. The 
German command in Greece was so convinced of the impregnability of Asopos that they 
believed the destruction was due to treachery. They condemned the entire German garrison 
to death, promptly shooting the commanding officer and several men.148 The specific 
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nature of the Asopos viaduct required that a bridge expert be flown in from Germany to 
effect the repairs. Five weeks after the initial sabotage, as a work crew was anchoring the 
new superstructure for the bridge, it collapsed. The collapse killed the bridge expert and 
forty workers, as well as hurling a large section of the bridge into the gorge.149 In total, the 
Greek rail line would remain broken well into October of 1943. For sixteen weeks, all Axis 
logistics through Greece were snarled.150      
Following the successful Asopos operation, acts of sabotage swept through Greece. 
British, and also now American, commandos assisted multiple Greek guerrilla bands in 
destroying and harassing Axis supply lines.151 Radio became the only viable means of 
communication in Greece, as telephone and telegraph lines across the country were cut and 
repair parties attacked. Guerrillas successfully blocked the main highway through 
Sarandopou pass, for two weeks, cutting off all overland travel between northern and 
southern Greece. Italians soldiers were unable to dislodge the roadblock due to continual 
guerrilla harassment. Regaining use of the road ultimately required the deployment of two 
reinforced German battalions who, after stiff resistance, removed the roadblock. Logistics 
travel along the east-west rail line was continually delayed as guerrillas cut the rail line in 
multiple places daily. Fifty miles of the main east-west highway through Greece was 
methodically demolished by the guerrillas rendering it completely unusable by the Axis. 
Guerrilla units dynamited every culvert and bridge on the road. In open sections of the 
highway, guerrillas either collapsed sections of cliff onto the road or blasted the 
embankments supporting the road, which dropped it into the gorge below. One of the 
American operational groups destroyed seven bridges, two locomotives, and killed 574 
axis soldiers during the summer of 1943.152 Outside Athens, guerrillas demolished the 
main bridge to southern Greece. In southern Greece, British and Greek saboteurs blew up 
a bridge as a train passed over it, causing massive German casualties as the train derailed 
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into a ravine. This created additional delays to Axis repairs of the bridge, as bodies, and 
the train itself, had to be recovered before repairs could begin.153  
In June and July of 1943, captured German soldiers stated it took them 17 days to 
travel from Athens to Epirus, a distance of 200 miles. This was because of constant 
sabotage to the lines of communication. Soldiers and materiel were forced wait at depots 
while repairs occurred. In response to this, Germany deployed an additional two divisions 
of troops, roughly 60,000 men, to secure Greece. The German deployment was brutal. 
Fearing an allied invasion, the German troops sought to stamp out any indigenous 
resistance as quickly as possible. Between July 2 and 5, of 1943, the Germans summarily 
executed 187 Greek citizens for suspicion of sabotage acts.154 These reprisals did not have 
the intended affect and instead hardened the guerrillas, who continued unabated. Then on 
July 11, the British commandos received word that the Allied landings in Sicily had 
succeeded and the guerrillas could stand down. As quickly as they had started their 
sabotage campaign the commandos and guerrillas ceased all operations and went 
underground to regroup. Two German Divisions were left impotent on the Greek mainland, 
unable to reinforce their peers in Sicily who were quickly overrun by Allied forces.  
5. Effects and Findings 
While guerrilla sabotage operations would continue until the end of the war, they 
would never again reach the levels seen in 1943. When Italy surrendered to the Allies in 
September of 1943, Germany assumed full occupation duties in Greece. The Germans 
estimated that between 67 and 80 percent of mainland Greece was under guerrilla control 
at the time.155 Both the countryside and the vital logistic lines were in the hands of the 
guerrillas. This issue was further confounded by the fact that an Italian division, totaling 
12,000 men, surrendered themselves and their equipment to the guerrillas after Italy 
vacated the war.156 This provided a huge number of arms to the guerrillas for use against 
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the Germans. While the Germans always retained the ability to travel anywhere in Greece 
in large formations, and conducted multiple large-scale clearing and anti-guerrilla 
operations, they would never regain this terrain. They would be violently harassed until 
their withdrawal in 1944.  
Owing to the fastidious record keeping of the British, Germans, and to a lesser 
extent, the Greeks and Italians, it is possible to identify concrete costs, results, and numbers 
from the Greek sabotage campaign. Over 18 months, Allied air support parachuted 2,514 
tons of equipment to the guerrillas, which cost $2.5 million. British payments to the 
guerrillas, in the form of gold sovereigns, cost between $1.6 and $3.2 million over the 
course of the campaign. Both of these figures are extremely low when compared with other 
campaigns. The Italian guerrillas and Yugoslav guerrillas received 6,000 tons and 16,500 
tons of supplies, respectively, during the same period. All of these numbers further pale in 
comparison to the general cost of an infantry division in the field for the same period. 
Lastly, the Greek guerrillas were decidedly cheaper and more accurate than conventional 
bombing missions.157        
The Greek guerrillas claim they suffered 4,500 killed and another 6,000 wounded 
between 1942 and 1944. This includes guerrilla casualties suffered during German anti-
guerrilla operations. This equates to roughly one in every four guerrillas being a casualty 
at some point. Another 70,000 Greek civilians were killed in reprisal attacks by both the 
Italian and German occupation forces.158 While these numbers seem extreme, they are in 
fact quite low compared to other Axis-occupied areas during the same time frame. 
Yugoslavia, for example, experienced 581,000 civilian casualties during Axis 
occupation.159 Germany suffered between 5,000 and 15,000 casualties at the hands of the 
Greek guerrillas. Though exact Italian casualties are unknown, it is likely they are much 
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higher due to their larger occupation force and the guerrillas’ tendency to target Italian 
formations over German formations.160  
The Special Operations Research Office at Johns Hopkins University estimated that 
the Greek guerrillas had a tie down effect of 1:3 on the Axis. This meant that the Axis 
dedicated three soldiers for every guerrilla they believed existed.161 In 1943, at the height 
of Axis occupation, there were roughly 22,000 guerrillas and 590,000 Axis soldiers in 
Greece.162 Elements of the Axis forces were there to defend against any potential invasion 
by the British from Egypt, however the bulk were there to thwart the guerrillas. This density 
of counter-guerrilla forces is a remarkable feat for such an impoverished and small 
territory, particularly when the guerrilla population was much smaller than what the 
Germans estimated, and their main activity was sabotage not pitched engagement with Axis 
forces.  
The American Surge in Iraq provides a powerful recent comparison. Greece during 
the 1940s had a population of approximately 7.3 million163 with an active guerrilla 
population of approximately 22,000.164 Conversely, Iraq, during the U.S. surge in 2007, 
had a population of approximately 28 million165 and an estimated Sunni insurgent 
population of 70,000.166 This gives fairly similar densities of guerrillas and insurgents at 
.03 percent and .025 percent of the population, respectively. In 1943, the Germans surged 
two Divisions, or 60,000 troops, to support counterinsurgency, bringing the total number 
of Axis troops to roughly 590,000 in Greece. This equated to roughly one Axis soldier for 
every twelve Greek citizens. For the surge in Iraq, the U.S. deployed an additional 30,000 
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soldiers for a total U.S. troop population of 170,000 soldiers.167 This equated to 
approximately one U.S. soldier for every 165 Iraqi citizens. These numbers do not take into 
account the Iraqi and multinational forces supporting counterinsurgency operations. 
However, it is safe to assume that even including them would not amount to anything close 
to a ratio of one soldier for every twelve Iraqi citizens. In order to get to the ratio Greece 
experienced, Iraq would have needed a little more than 2.3 million troops on the streets. 
This is simply not feasible today. A RAND study from 2011 highlights that the U.S. Army, 
who provided the overwhelming bulk of ground forces, possessed very little unutilized 
manpower during the Surge.168 There were essentially no more U.S. Army units to deploy. 
Most importantly in examining this comparison is the reality that, despite such a high 
soldier to insurgent ratio, the Greek guerrillas continued to conduct regular and successful 
sabotage operations.  
The impact of Greek guerrilla sabotage attacks on Axis logistics provided valuable 
strategic support to Allied operations. Constant sabotage of the limited Greek railway 
system created huge logistical shortfalls for the German Afrika Corps. The sabotage of the 
Gorgopotamos and Asopos Viaducts stopped all rail traffic to North Africa for six and 
sixteen weeks, respectively. Only 415 miles of the 1,700 miles of railway infrastructure in 
Greece remained usable by 1944.169 Guerrillas destroyed 1,300 bridges and forced 
German convoys to travel with heavy protection. This stressed German materiel means, 
particularly trucks and gasoline, which were in short supply. During the lead up to the 
Allied invasion of Sicily, Greek guerrillas tied up two German Divisions, in addition to the 
500,000 Italian troops and 30,000 German troops already tasked with occupation duty. This 
denied the Axis valuable reinforcements during the Allied landings.  
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6. Conclusion and Future Potentialities 
The Greek guerrillas and their sabotage campaign are overshadowed by the reality 
that, following the conclusion of World War Two, Greece experienced a civil war. This 
civil war was fought by the same disparate guerrilla bands, specifically the communist 
bands, that had fought against the Axis occupation. While not addressed in this case study, 
the British, and later American, commandos spent much of their time during WW2 
convincing the different guerrilla bands to work in coordination with each other rather than 
independently or against each other. This was particularly true between the republican and 
communist guerrilla factions who bitterly hated each other. With the withdrawal of the 
Axis occupation these elements quickly turned on each other. The Greek Civil War would 
require the deployment of U.S. advisors as well as economic and military support to subdue 
communist elements and restore peace to Greece.170 This is how Greece in the 1940s is 
generally remembered.  
This overshadowing, however, ignores the lessons, and strategic impact, of the 
Greek guerrillas in World War Two. By taking advantage of favorable terrain and 
understanding the logistical requirements of a modern army, the guerrillas were able to 
have an oversized impact during the war. The Asopos viaduct operation is considered one 
of the greatest acts of sabotage during the war.171 Six commandos with a small bag of 
explosives denied Axis forces access to rail logistics for a whole theater of operations for 
sixteen weeks. Guerrilla sabotage operations forced the Axis to dedicate valuable men and 
material to safeguard lines of communication which meant they could not be employed 
elsewhere.  
The Greek guerrillas highlighted the criticality and vulnerability of logistics in 
modern war and how affecting it can limit escalation. Viaduct sabotage in Greece affected 
German operations in North Africa and removed critical combat power from the front lines. 
Limiting access to the materiel that enables war limits the ability to wage such wars. The 
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specific targeting of viaducts and roadways through mountainous terrain delayed repairs 
and made interdiction efforts by counterguerrilla forces very difficult. The Greek guerrillas 
showed how low-cost directed sabotage against critical transportation infrastructure can 
impact strategic capabilities and affect theater level operations. 
E. CASE STUDY #3 THE WIND OF REVOLUTION: THE WEATHER 
UNDERGROUND 
We have attacked the Capitol because it is, along with the White House and 
the Pentagon, the worldwide symbol of the government which is now 
attacking Indochina. To millions of people here and in Latin America, 
Africa, and Asia, it is the monument to U.S. domination over the planet. 
The invaders of Laos will not have peace in this country  
—Weather Underground, communiqué 8, February 28, 1971 
 
1. Introduction 
On Saturday July 26th, 1969, two bombs exploded at the United Fruit Warehouse 
along the Hudson River in New York City. The forty sticks of dynamite used in the bombs 
damaged a door and punched a hole in the warehouse’s outer wall. While not particularly 
meaningful in a destructive sense, the warehouse was used as storage for a tugboat 
company, the explosions were historic. They marked the start of the Radical Underground 
bombing campaign in America.172 The protesters of the ‘60s threw rocks and Molotov 
cocktails. The Radical Underground, an umbrella term for the myriad domestic terrorist 
groups of the 1970s and ‘80s, would use bombs. In 1972, Radical Underground groups 
conducted 1,900 bombings in America.173 Those numbers are unimaginable today, when 
a single small explosion will bring dozens, if not hundreds, of federal and local officials to 
the scene.  
The most successful of these groups was the Weather Underground, or simply the 
Weathermen. A radical left-wing group, the Weather Underground publicly declared war 
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on America. It would go on to conduct dozens of attacks, including successfully bombing 
the Pentagon, the State Department, and the U.S. Capital Building, before dissolving in the 
late 1970s.174 What made the Weather Underground so successful was its willingness to 
take risks, and its outside support from Cuba and North Vietnam.175 Extensive literature 
exists on the Weathermen, much of it written by former Weathermen, though little exists 
to discuss the benefit they provided to their sponsors. The Weather Underground provides 
a valuable historic case study on the validity of providing proxy support to domestic 
terrorist organizations. The Weather Underground shows that supporting domestic 
terrorism, particularly the sabotage and bombings against security forces for which the 
group was known, is a means to disrupt and impose costs on a country without escalating 
to interstate violence. With a return to multipolarity in international affairs, it is pertinent 
to understand this option.  
2. Background 
The 1960s and early 70s saw the United States and much of the world in turmoil.176 
U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War was unpopular. The Cuban Missile Crisis had almost 
destroyed the world. The assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr. were fresh in the collective U.S. memory. The civil rights movement 
remained a divisive topic. For the first time in history, war and racial injustice were being 
broadcast directly into people’s living rooms. The youth of America, having grown up with 
parents who extolled America as all that was right in the world, were appalled.177 Hunter 
S. Thompson, writing for Rolling Stone, colorfully described the period between 1965 and 
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1970 as a “nightmare of failure.”178 His coverage of the Democratic National Convention 
in 1968 is even more damning.  
Probably it was Chicago – that brain-raping week in August of ‘68. I went 
to the Democratic Convention as a journalist, and returned a raving beast. 
For me, that week in Chicago was far worse than the worst bad acid trip I’d 
even heard rumors about. It permanently altered my brain chemistry, and 
my first new idea – when I finally calmed down – was an absolute 
conviction there was no possibility for any personal truce, for me, in a nation 
that could hatch and be proud of a malignant monster like Chicago179 
It was in this context, this belief that America was not what they were told it was, 
and not what they wanted, that youth protest groups sprang up to fight injustice, as they 
saw it. The first and largest college protest organization was the Students for a Democratic 
Society (SDS). The SDS served as the initial organization that many of the later domestic 
terror groups, such as the Weather Underground, would come from. A left-wing 
organization, the SDS protested for civil rights and against the Vietnam War with slogans 
such as “Not with my body you don’t.”180 As early as 1966, though, SDS leaders saw 
limited responses to their protests and began to talk about the need for violent action under 
the new slogan “From Protest to Resistance.”181 Peaceful protests in America continued 
to be met with police violence and limited change in policy. Then in 1968, multiple protests 
erupted around the world almost simultaneously. In North America, South America, and 
both Eastern and Western Europe, workers and citizens yelled and fought their 
governments for change. It seemed that the revolution was underway. It was from this 
turmoil that members of the SDS decided violence was necessary, and the Weather 
Underground was formed.  
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3. Foundations and Initial Actions 
The Weathermen officially formed in a Chicago apartment in the winter of 1968–
69.182 They took their name from a Bob Dylan song and viewed themselves as the 
vanguard of the revolution to overthrow America. In their minds, they were the winds of 
change. The FBI, which was monitoring the SDS, identified the formation of the 
Weathermen, and from the very beginning viewed the group as a strategic threat to 
America.183 The FBI’s number two man went so far as to state that the Weathermen could 
be more damaging than the Communist Party in America had been during the 1930s.184 In 
early 1969, the Weathermen sought to turn themselves from the affluent coffee shop 
intellectuals they were into the “urban fighting force” that their leader John Jacobs, known 
as JJ, desired. The Weathermen sent cells from their initial cadre of followers in Chicago, 
to every major city in America. They then began conducting street brawls against police. 
They also invaded high schools and university classrooms, where they preached the need 
for violent revolution, to garner support. This work culminated in the Days of Rage, 
beginning October 8, 1969.185    
The Days of Rage were not a tactical success. The series of violent riots in Chicago 
were far smaller and more expensive, in literal U.S. dollars, than the Weathermen had 
anticipated. Leaders of the Weather Underground hoped that thousands of young 
revolutionaries would show up in Chicago’s Lincoln Park to support the revolutionary 
movement. Around 200 actually attended. Initially, the Chicago Police were unprepared, 
and the small crowd of Weathermen were able to leave the park and began destroying a 
wealthy neighborhood nearby. The police quickly responded, stopped the riot, and arrested 
a number of the Weathermen. Three days later, the Weathermen tried again to riot. This 
time, the police were prepared and arrested over 120 rioters. In total, the riots cost the SDS, 
which the Weather Underground was still technically a part of, $2.3 million in bail money 
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alone.186 The rioters did fairly minimal damage and were easily bested by the police. 
Despite this shaky start, the Days of Rage nevertheless cemented the Weather Underground 
as a radical militant organization. This enabled it to garner support and funding from 
domestic and international donors. The riots also convinced Weather Underground 
leadership that protests and open street brawls were futile. More violent clandestine urban 
guerrilla tactics were necessary.187    
 
Figure 12. Weathermen Leading the Days of Rage Protests in Chicago188 
Following the riots in Chicago, many members of the Weather Underground 
disappeared into the social underground of America. They moved to different cities and 
adopted new names and identities to defeat police and FBI monitoring. Identity theft was 
a whole branch of the Weathermen. They needed to ensure that members always had spare 
identities in the event their covers were blown. Their most popular tactic was to use the 
records from dead infants to file for social security cards, which would then allow them to 
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get drivers’ licenses and government identification.189  With the ability to assume new 
identities and avoid detection, the Weather Underground now felt they could begin their 
bombing campaign. 
4. Proxy Support and Bombing Campaign  
The Soviet Union and its various communist allies directly and indirectly sponsored 
several proxy forces in America during the Cold War. The Weather Underground was one 
of those proxies. Police and the FBI labeled the Weather Underground as a domestic 
terrorist organization. However, declassified Top Secret FBI documents show that the key 
members of the Weathermen were trained and sponsored by the Cuban government.190 
These FBI documents from 1976 show that the Cuban government, who viewed the United 
States as its number one enemy, used the Weather Underground as a means to support its 
national policy goals. The Weather Underground was further sponsored and supported by 
the North Vietnamese government as a tool to stir up anti-war sentiment in hopes that 
domestic dissent would force the United States to withdraw from South Vietnam.191 The 
North Vietnamese went so far as to encourage the Weather Underground to recruit 
individuals who had already shown a hatred for authority, such as those who had previous 
histories fighting the police. This was a departure from other leftist organizations in the 
1960–70s who largely recruited from college campuses.192 Starting in July of 1969, before 
the Weather Underground conducted any violent actions, they met in Cuba with 
representatives of the Cuban and North Vietnamese governments. These communist 
advisors provided guidance and training for “revolutionary acts.” This foreign influence 
and advisement would continue throughout the 1970s.193   
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“Beyond any doubt, Cuba has shaped, supplied technical training to, given political 
indoctrination for and, perhaps most important of all, served as the inspiration for the 
American radical movement in its avowed aim to bring down the American system that it 
so fiercely despises,” reads a passage from declassified FBI documents outlining the 
influence and support by a foreign power that the Weather Underground received.194 
Documents further show that the Cuban Mission to the United Nations conducted secret 
meetings and dispersed funds to support “revolutionary acts” within the United States.195 
However, Weather Underground members met not just with Cuban advisors but also with 
North Vietnamese, Soviet, and Chinese advisors. North Vietnamese advisors wanted the 
Weather Underground to “Bring the war home.” They actively supported Weathermen acts 
of violence in the U.S..196 The North Vietnamese told Bernadine Dohrn, a senior member 
of the Weathermen, said that “you must begin to wage armed struggle as soon as 
possible.”197 They went so far as to present the Weathermen with rings made from the 
metal of U.S. fighter jets shot down in Vietnam.198 
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Figure 13. Poster for the Days of Rage Protests199 
71 
With foreign support and training, on October 7, 1969, the Weather Underground 
conducted its first bombing, to coincide with the Days of Rage, destroying the police 
monument at Haymarket Square in Chicago. Subsequently, the Weather Underground took 
up an initial tactic of bombing police stations and courthouses. They bombed the Berkeley 
Police station, the Chicago Police Department, and firebombed the house of a judge in New 
York City. On March 6th, 1970, a Weather Underground safe house exploded in Greenwich 
Village, killing three Weathermen who were preparing bombs to attack a U.S. Army dance 
in Fort Dix, New Jersey. In the wake of the explosion, and the death of several members, 
the Weathermen opted to begin a campaign of strategic sabotage against U.S. government 
facilities rather than personnel.200 Throughout 1970–71, the Weather Underground built 
and stocked “bomb factories” in major U.S. cities such as New York, San Francisco, 
Detroit, and Chicago, while also successfully bombing the New York Police Headquarters, 
the Pentagon, and a California prison. In 1973, they bombed the International Telephone 
and Telegraph Corporation in New York City. In 1974, the Weathermen successfully 
bombed the Gulf Oil Headquarters and the Office of the California Attorney General. 
Finally, in 1975, they bombed the State Department and the U.S. Capitol building.201 In 
total, the Weather Underground would be responsible for more than two dozen bombings 
and attempted bombings, 19 of them against strategic government facilities, in less than 
five years.  
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Figure 14. Aftermath of the New York City Townhouse Explosion that 
Killed Three Weathermen202  
5. Copycats and Effects 
The Weather Underground’s focus on attacking government and industrial 
infrastructure did not go unnoticed. After the Weather Underground publicly released its 
manifesto, Prairiefire, in early 1974, multiple homegrown groups attempted to copy 
Weathermen tactics. Twenty bombings and attempted bombings occurred in California 
alone.203 The impact these bombings had, not just in physical damage but also in 
psychological effect, was far reaching. The Quicksilver Times Newspaper of Washington, 
D.C., published an article on November 20, 1970 arguing that by 1972, Americans should 
expect a guerrilla war in the United States. The article continued by saying that a few acts 
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of strategic sabotage combined with political assassinations would “bring America to an 
angry, ass-grinding halt.”204 Dismantling and defeating the Weather Underground and its 
fellow Radical Left terror groups was the FBI’s number one priority. 
Despite its consistent pace of operations, the Weather Underground cost very little 
to operate. Its bombs were exceedingly cheap to make and employ. In 1970, twenty-three 
states had limited to no restrictions on dynamite sales, and sixty dollars bought two cases 
of dynamite. Two cases were enough to build multiple bombs.205 Bill Ayers, one of the 
founders, stated in his memoir, Fugitive Days, that the operation to bomb the Pentagon had 
cost less than $500.206 Conversely, that same bomb caused over $100,000 in physical 
damage and even more in psychological effects to the U.S. Government. Following the 
bombing of the New York City Police Headquarters, substantial security upgrades were 
made across the city at both public and private buildings, at no small cost.207 The 
Weathermen’ bombing of the U.S. Capital building alone did more than $300,000 in 
damage.208 These were significant impacts based on the low cost of employment their 
bombs and the oversized political impacts the subsequent explosions had.  
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Figure 15. NYPD HQ after the Weather Underground Bombing 1970209 
The size of the Weather Underground also enabled it to keep costs low, maintain 
secrecy, and subsequently avoid detection and apprehension. The New York cell of the 
Weather Underground, for example, averaged six people. The U.S. Government spent tens 
of millions of dollars and thousands of man hours in New York alone trying to track down 
these six people. The FBI had Weathermen Task Forces in many major cities.210 In 1970, 
two thousand Federal Agents were assigned to counter the Weathermen and its Radical 
Left peers.211  All of these cost time, energy and money. That was time, energy, and money 
that could not be used elsewhere. The investment in the Weather Underground by donors, 
such as Cuba and North Vietnam, was seemingly small compared to the rewards. 
Unfortunately, it is unknown exactly how much money and training Cuba and North 
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Vietnam provided to the Weather Underground, as no element has ever spoken about it. 
Additionally, Cuba and North Vietnam hid their contributions through a number of cut outs 
and intermediaries. It has been suggested that the National Lawyers Guild, which 
represented first the SDS and later Weather Underground members at trial, was the premier 
intermediary for financial support to the Weather Underground. The U.S. Government has 
been unable to legally substantiate this claim, however. It is clear, though, that members of 
the National Lawyers Guild did provide money, representation, and housing to members 
of the Radical Left, including the Weather Underground.212  
6. Dissolution and Findings 
The Weather Underground would dissolve in the mid-1970s for a multitude of 
reasons, not least of which was its members desire to live. The death of three Weathermen 
in an accidental explosion, in Greenwich Village, took a heavy toll on the group. While 
they valued their far-left ideals, none of the members wanted to die over these ideals. The 
American drawdown in Vietnam also meant that the Weather Underground was losing its 
anti-war pillar.213 Another factor that led to the dissolution of the Weather Underground 
resulted from the illegal operations that the FBI had conducted while investigating the 
group. These missteps by the FBI forced Federal Prosecutors to drop almost all the charges 
against the Weathermen.214 This provided a viable exit strategy for many members of the 
Weathermen, two of whom were on the FBI’s top ten most-wanted list. Lastly, the U.S. 
people, particularly the young college students who were the Weathermen’s base, had 
moved on. U.S. culture adopted the clothes, music, and hairstyles of the counterculture, but 
had no interest in its politics. The Weathermen and their revolution became irrelevant.215  
What remains overlooked is the outside support that the Weather Underground 
received and the U.S. response to this support. According to the Weather Underground, 
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much of its funding came from the radical National Lawyers Guild.216 The National 
Lawyers Guild maintained ties with the Cuban government, which likely enabled them to 
funnel money to the Weather Underground. Regardless, it is clear that Cuba and North 
Vietnam supported the Weather Underground with training, support, and funding.217 Why 
then did the United States not actively work to dissuade and disrupt this support? This 
support went to terrorists who subsequently blew up U.S. infrastructure. Austin Carson’s 
theory provides a potential answer. 
Support to the Weather Underground from the North Vietnamese Government 
makes logical sense. The U.S. and North Vietnamese governments were in a conventional 
war in Indochina and the North Vietnamese were looking for alternative ways to affect the 
U.S. Cuba, though, was not at war with the U.S. Why then did Cuba, a miniscule country 
in terms of power, seek to covertly support domestic terrorists? For example, in early 1970, 
the Chicago Daily News reported that, with the exception of the actual representative to 
the United Nations, every member of the Cuban Mission to the UN in New York was a 
Cuban Intelligence Officer tasked with supporting subversion in the United States. Then 
later the same year, two Cuban officials were declared persona non grata in the U.S. after 
a still classified issue that involved support to far-left U.S. radicals and involved 
explosives.218   
Applying Austin Carson’s framework for covert interaction provides a theory for 
why the U.S. and Cuba acted the way they did.219 His theory, applied to the case study of 
the Weather Underground, also illuminates a potential future use for domestic terrorists in 
a multipolar world. Carson’s theory is that states look to limit escalation in conflict for a 
number of reasons, but particularly if that escalation could lead to outright inter-state 
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conventional or nuclear war. This need to limit escalation leads aggressor states to 
intervene covertly, or sub-conventionally. Often this covert intervention is identified by the 
opposing state. From here, Carson argues that the opposing state, not desiring to escalate 
either, will often deny, refuse to acknowledge, or even actively collude with the intervening 
state to hide the covert intervention.  
In the case of the Weather Underground, Carson’s theory seems to explain why 
U.S. authorities, intelligence officials, and leaders did not actively seek to expose or thwart 
foreign support, particularly support from Cuba and North Vietnam. The United States was 
already in a costly war with North Vietnam. It was simultaneously shouldering the brunt 
of conventional and nuclear deterrence operations against the Soviet Union in Europe. The 
failed Bay of Pigs invasion and the feverish nightmare of the Cuban Missile Crisis were 
still fresh in leaders’ minds. If Cuban direct support to domestic terrorists became open 
knowledge, the U.S. government may have been forced to openly act against Cuba because 
of hawkish domestic pressure. This was likely viewed as an unacceptable escalation by 
U.S. government officials and leaders. Officials instead opted to hide the evidence of 
foreign involvement and directly target the Weather Underground.  
From the Cubans’ perspective, their leaders viewed the U.S. as enemy number 
one.220 Again, the failed Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban missile crisis showed that the 
American government was openly hostile to the government of Cuba. However, Cuba 
lacked a traditional overt means to affect American policy, such as economic embargoes 
or military coercion. It instead opted to intervene covertly in American affairs as a means 
of costly signaling about Cuba’s resolve against the United States.221 Cuba was so 
successful in this that the Senior Counterintelligence Officer for the Defense Intelligence 
Agency listed Cuban covert capabilities as being among the best in the world.222 This 
costly signaling also provided Cuba the opportunity to present a voice of peace and civility 
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on its front stage, through the Cuban Mission to the United Nations, while enabling more 
assertive backstage discussions with the United States. It is speculative, but this more 
assertive backstage may explain why the Department of Defense listed Cuba as a threat to 
U.S. technologies.223 Overall though, it seems accurate to say that Cuba correctly judged 
that while the United States viewed Cuba as a threat, it did not wish to risk escalation in 
the Caribbean. 
7. Conclusion and Future Potentialities  
The Weather Underground were wildly successful for a group of upper-class 
college students with no background in guerrilla warfare. With less than fifty core 
members, they occupied 20 percent of the FBI’s most wanted list at one point.224 Their 
actions are unique among the other case studies and examples in that they show the effects 
of a stochastic campaign of sabotage against the pillars of society. This is vastly different 
than the other studies which highlight campaigns against military functions. Ultimately, 
their bombing campaign caused millions of dollars in damage and diverted incredible 
amounts of the U.S. domestic security apparatus to combat such a small organization. They 
publicized their actions and encouraged copycat bombings, which is also unique in the 
presented case studies. The Weather Underground is a key case study of far-left terror 
groups and sabotage organizations.  
Additionally, Cuba and North Vietnam’s involvement, posturing with, and support 
to the Weather Underground highlights the low-cost high-reward potential in covertly 
supporting resistance groups. To further this point, U.S. willingness to publicly downplay 
foreign support to a labeled domestic terror organization provides an interesting precedent 
to explore future potentialities. With a return to multipolarity in world politics, in particular 
the rise of Russia and China, the more traditional and overt means that America uses to 
strong-arm bellicose powers become less useful. While not foolproof, the Weather 
Underground case study provides promise. Covert support to foreign resistance 
movements, particularly those that focus on the destruction of government infrastructure, 
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could serve as a viable low-cost tool to impose costs and re-direct security and military 
assets to domestic security vice external security, while concurrently reducing the risk of 
escalation to overt conflict.  
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A. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM THEN TO NOW AND WHY 
ATTACKING IT MATTERS 
This thesis is predicated on two arguments about infrastructure. The first is that 
infrastructure design has remained fairly consistent over the last 100 years. Second is 
reliance on critical infrastructure has increased while the ability to build and repair such 
infrastructure has decreased.  
  The first argument does not imply that critical infrastructure has not 
improved over the last century. It means that the infrastructure’s base form has remained 
consistent. Put simply, a car from the early 1900s could drive on a modern road because a 
road’s base form has remained the same even if the technology involved in construction 
has greatly improved. Likewise, power generation and distribution, as an example, have 
utilized similar means across the last century. The primary method continues to be 
centralized generation of power and then distribution along lines to consumers.225 While 
the efficiency has increased, all issues with this system remain the same. Distribution 
through electric cables remains the primary form of electricity transfer worldwide. Damage 
to these cables, such as a tree falling and severing a cable during a storm, results in the 
cessation of power transfer. This remains as true today as it did in 1900.  
For further proof of this consistency in critical infrastructure’s base form, examine 
the structure of railroads, which were a primary target of saboteurs in the case studies. 
Railroads operate by a train locomotive, and its subsequent cars, running along two vertical 
rails laid in parallel a set distance apart on a track. The distance between the rails is called 
the gauge.226 Worldwide, there are three distinct gauge sizes: narrow, standard, and broad. 
These gauge sizes were standardized in the mid-1800s.227 Following the Civil War, the 
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Lincoln administration mandated that all railroads in the U.S. be built on the same gauge 
for efficiency in logistics and personnel movement.228 This became standard gauge and 
accounts for 60 percent of railroads worldwide.229 The second most widely used gauge is 
broad gauge. It is found in Russia and many former Soviet states. It was standardized by 
Czar Nicholas I in the 1840s.230 Trains are designed to run along rails of a specific gauge 
and any change to this gauge can have detrimental effects on a train to include derailment. 
While materials have improved, the assembly of rail lines has remained essentially 
unchanged since trains were invented. A level base layer is carved out of the ground. On 
top of this cleared ground are placed cross ties made of either wood or concrete, usually 
twenty inches apart. Finally, the metal rails are laid on top of the cross ties and fastened to 
the cross ties with spikes.231 This level of standardization, in both gauge and assembly of 
the rail line, means that, while rail technology has improved over the last century, the base 
infrastructure of railroads remains essentially unchanged.   
The second argument, that reliance on critical infrastructure has increased while the 
ability to construct or repair this infrastructure has decreased, is critical to understanding 
how infrastructure sabotage can affect interstate competition. Two simple comparisons 
anchor this argument. The first is comparing critical infrastructure requirements over the 
last 100 years. The second is comparing critical infrastructure construction and repair 
times.  
The first comparison, comparing infrastructure requirements across time, is easily 
done. The Combat Studies Institute of the U.S. Army published a paper in 2007 specifically 
on the increasing logistics requirements of modern armies, which was mentioned earlier in 
Chapter 2.232 John McGrath’s study on the increasing Tooth to Tail Ratio (T3R) of modern 
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forces provides quantitative proof that the logistics requirements continue to increase in 
order to enable the employment of advanced combat forces. Between World War One and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2005, the T3R has grown from 60:40 to 25:75. In the span of 
85 years, the U.S. military went from 60 percent of its forces being combat related to only 
25 percent. The remaining 75 percent of military forces conduct logistics and support 
functions.233 This is in no small part due to the ever-increasing requirements to maintain 
advanced military technology. For instance, the M1 tank, the current U.S. Main Battle 
Tank, requires three times the fuel and 20 percent more repair stockpiles than the M60 tank 
that preceded it.234 This rise in logistics demands an increased reliance on critical 
infrastructure in order to maintain forces in the field.235  
Logistics is not the only modern requirement that has increased reliance on critical 
infrastructure. Like the M1 referenced above, many modern pieces of military hardware 
have robust infrastructure requirements that are far more robust than previous generations 
of equipment. The Royal Australian Air Force, which opted to upgrade from the F/A-18 
fighter jet to the F-35A, is in the midst of improving their facilities because their current 
infrastructure is insufficient to support the F-35A. The F-35A requires an improved runway 
with a minimum length of 8,000 meters and a preferred length of 10,000 meters. This is 
drastically more than the F-18 it is replacing. Additionally, due to its stealth coating, the F-
35A cannot be left outside in either the sun or the rain. Every F-35A requires a hangar and 
individual maintenance area which are both requirements that did not exist with the F-
18.236 The infrastructure required in order to enable operation of the F-35A, also severely 
restricts the number of facilities where the aircraft can operate. Lastly, all maintainers on 
the F-35A are required to have security clearances to safeguard and protect the planes 
technology which further increases the tail requirements. Similarly, it is rumored that China 
is unable to operate its fighter aircraft from the Spratly islands because the runways are not 
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improved enough to support the landing and takeoff of modern jet fighters.237A decrease 
in access to any critical infrastructure, transportation, energy, manufacturing or otherwise 
is much more likely to adversely affect conventional military capabilities than at any time 
in history.  
The second comparison between repair times is similarly straightforward. Repair 
times on critical infrastructure continue to increase, particularly if this infrastructure is 
large physical infrastructure. Take, for example, the Asopos viaduct operation and compare 
it to the recent destruction of the Central Washington Railroad (CWR) bridge over the 
Yakima River in Washington State. The Asopos viaduct was a complex and strategically 
important bridge through a narrow mountain pass. The Central Washington Railroad bridge 
is the primary rail bridge through central Washington.238 The sabotage of the Asopos 
viaduct, in 1943, required that a bridge specialist be flown in from Germany; the repairs 
took place in extremely restrictive terrain and under hostile conditions. Overall Asopos 
took 16 weeks to repair.239 Comparatively the CWR bridge, which was destroyed in 
September of 2020, is not in hostile territory and is in non-mountainous terrain with access 
to vast American resources. It is estimated that the bridge will not be repaired until April 
of 2021 a time period of seven months, or 28 weeks.240 Understanding now the growth in 
repair times the destruction of infrastructure is likelier now to have a longer lasting impact 
than in the case studies.   
B. EFFECTS ON ESCALATION 
The case studies examined, in Chapter 3, provide mixed evidence of sabotage as an 
escalation management tool. In the case of Lawrence of Arabia, the British and the 
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Ottomans were already in all-out declared conventional war. Similarly, Greece was an Axis 
occupied country with Britain and Germany at war. In both instances there was little left 
to escalate. Conversely, the Weather Underground shows promise as an example of using 
sabotage as an escalation tool while also imposing costs on a competitor.   
The Lawrence of Arabia case study fails to support Carson’s theory on covert 
interaction and escalation management. However, it does provide intriguing evidence for 
the validity of sabotage as a means to combat conventional forces, shorten conflict 
duration, and reduce casualties on both sides. Lawrence’s campaign against the Medina 
railroad effectively kept the Ottoman garrison at Medina out of the war for two years.241 
The Medina garrison was led by a competent commander and equipped with state-of-the-
art weapons and equipment.242 By sabotaging the railroad just enough that the Ottomans 
chose to repair it rather than withdrawing from Medina, Lawrence kept the garrison from 
being used to combat British forces maneuvering from the Sinai. This saved countless 
Allied and Ottoman lives prevented the brutal industrial war carnage and casualties that 
typified fighting in World War One. Also, by removing the Medina Garrison from 
operations in the Middle East, Lawrence and his train pirates directly reduced the duration 
of combat. The British were able to launch a quick decisive offensive from the Sinai and 
force the Ottoman Empire to an armistice. This was partly possible because the British 
were not concerned about a flank attack from the Medina Garrison.  
While the Greek case study also fails to support Carson’s theory it, like Lawrence’s 
campaign, shows evidence of sabotage’s validity in providing strategic opportunities. The 
Greek guerrillas’ ability to hold up almost 600,000 Axis troops directly contributed to the 
Allies’ success in invading Sicily. With so many Axis troops stationed in Greece, 
particularly the two additional German divisions sent in 1943 to conduct counter-guerrilla 
operations, the Axis powers were unable to reinforce their defenders in Sicily. The British 
described the Greek operations as a strategic victory in the Mediterranean Theater.243 
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Similar to Lawrence’s campaign, the Greek guerrillas also likely contributed to reducing 
casualties by tying up so many Axis forces for occupation duty. With these forces unable 
to support offensive and defensive operations against the Allied powers, they were unable 
to contribute to or become part of the massive casualty statistics of World War Two.  
Finally, the Weather Underground campaign does provide support for Carson’s 
theory. The Weathermen received indoctrination, training, and support from communist 
states, specifically Cuba and North Vietnam.244 The United States knew the Weathermen 
were receiving external support from belligerent states and did not make this information 
public. Cuba, in particular, used the Weathermen as a means to signal resolve to the United 
States that they were willing and able to conduct kinetic operations inside the United States 
but did not desire to escalate to more open conflict. In turn, the United States signaled its 
intent to not escalate the conflict between the two countries by labeling the Weathermen as 
a domestic terrorist organization rather than a foreign proxy. By doing this, both sides 
signaled that covert meddling between the countries was acceptable but more overt action 
was both undesirable and unwanted. This costly signaling by both countries enabled them 
to utilize harsh public rhetoric while having a more nuanced backstage relationship.  
C. SABOTAGE AS AN ECONOMY OF FORCE OPERATION  
All three case studies support the idea that sabotage campaigns serve as valuable 
economy of force operations. All three of the campaigns analyzed show that very small 
groups of saboteurs can have dramatic impacts on much larger enemy organizations. This 
utilization of small sabotage forces allowed leaders and planners to focus their limited 
manpower and materiel elsewhere while presenting their enemies with multiple dilemmas. 
Lawrence’s small group of cameleers exacted a terrible toll on the Medina garrison while 
enabling General Allenby’s larger campaign through the Sinai Peninsula and Palestine. 
The Greek guerrillas forced the Axis powers to commit 590,000 troops to secure Greece, 
continually damaged German logistics capabilities, and served as a strategic decoy for the 
invasion of Sicily. The Weather Underground’s bombing campaign maintained covert 
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pressure on the U.S. government, which allowed the Cuban government to focus its 
resources on regime changes in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Grenada, and Angola.245 
This finding is also critical from a friendly manpower perspective. The sabotage 
campaigns examined are all light on personnel requirements. The overall Greek campaign 
at its peak only used 30 British and American advisors.246 The Asopos viaduct sabotage, 
for example, required six saboteurs yet stopped German rail logistics through Greece for 
sixteen weeks.247 Lawrence of Arabia’s Yarmuk operation consisted of only sixty camel 
raiders and successfully stranded the Ottoman Eighth Corps Headquarters after derailing 
their train.248 The Weather Underground’s New York cell averaged six people, and their 
bombing of the New York City Police Headquarters was conducted by a single person.249 
These are tremendous effects for such small groups of saboteurs.  
   This friendly manpower perspective is especially important when placed in the 
context of current U.S. military personnel realities. The Army continues to struggle with 
both recruitment and retention.250 The Air Force is 2,100 pilots short of the 21,000 it 
requires to execute the National Defense Strategy.251 The Marine Corps, similarly, 
requires an additional 800 pilots to fill its 4,000 required billets.252 The Navy is the only 
service that is “cautiously optimistic” that it can meet their recruiting requirements to 
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sustain their current size.253 These personnel realities force U.S. leaders and planners to 
make tough decisions about risks to the force which also constrains conventional 
deployment and employment options.  
In addition to these shortfalls, in the event of a protracted conflict, it is highly 
questionable whether the U.S. could quickly replace casualties or grow the size of the 
military. During 2007, the military was almost fully utilized between the Surge in Iraq, 
operations in Afghanistan, and National Defense requirements.254 Recruitment remains 
sluggish and the current Selective Service System is untested. If Selective Service was 
activated during a catastrophic event, it has no requirement to deliver draftees to the 
services for the first 193 days, or just over six months.255 Then it is the services’ job to 
train and employ these draftees. The current length of the U.S. Army Infantry course is 22 
weeks, or five and a half months.256 This means that it would take just shy of a year before 
any additional infantry forces were available for employment. It is important to note that 
these would just be basic infantry soldiers, not individuals in technical fields such as pilots, 
UAV operators, intelligence analysts, electronic warfare technicians, or medics.  
This all implies that force protection is critical for U.S. leaders. The smaller the 
number of U.S. servicemembers exposed to danger prior to outright conflict, the better. 
Replacing lost servicemembers is a long slow process. This makes the potential 
employment of saboteurs appealing because so few personnel are required. TE Lawrence’s 
campaign was coordinated through the British HQ in Cairo but executed by himself and 
his Bedouin partners.257 The entirety of the Greek guerrilla campaign was executed by no 
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more than 30 British, and later American, commandos who worked alongside the 
Greeks.258 The Weather Underground never numbered more than roughly 150 active 
members, spread out across the United States.259 The utilization of such small groups of 
saboteurs in collaboration with indigenous partners reduces the number of potential 
friendly personnel losses while simultaneously reducing a competitors’ ability to employ 
and maintain their forces and capabilities.  
D. BEST PRACTICES IDENTIFIED 
Following examination of the case studies, five best practices for utilizing sabotage 
were identified. These are: the use of advisors; indigenous partners; appropriate 
technology; command, not necessarily control; and effects based. These best practices are 
discussed in further detail below. 
1. Direct Advisors  
The employment of direct advisors to conduct sabotage campaigns appears critical 
to success, particularly during large-scale combat operations. Both the Arab and Greek 
guerrillas experienced only marginal success until the introduction of on-ground advisors. 
These advisors, while technically not commanders of the various guerrilla bands, often 
took direct charge of operations and tied their operations back to strategic objectives. The 
advisors also brought technical and material support to their units that was not available 
otherwise. Additionally, advisors on the ground were able to conduct unilateral operations 
that were beyond the skill or capability of their indigenous partners. Such was the case with 
the Asopos viaduct, which the British conducted without the Greeks because the Greeks 
believed the operation was beyond their capability.260 Direct Advisors also allowed 
commanders and planners to receive ground truth on operations, capabilities, and issues. 
Ground truth is incredibly important, as incorrect information may lead commanders and 
planners to misallocate resources or select a course of action that is incongruent with 
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reality. These ground truths, provided by advisors, were often more accurate than 
information provided by indigenous forces, who would often exaggerate operations or 
capabilities in order to receive additional support and material.261 Direct advisors were 
paramount to the successes of the Arab and Greek campaigns. Conversely, the Weather 
Underground lacked direct advisors and while their campaign took a huge financial toll on 
the United States the campaign failed to achieve its goal of overthrowing the American 
government.  
2. Indigenous Partners  
While saboteurs can certainly operate unilaterally, their success is greatly improved 
with the introduction of indigenous partners. Indigenous forces possess an understanding 
of the culture and geography of their respective region better than any foreigner ever can. 
T.E. Lawrence spoke Arabic and worked throughout the Middle East on archeological digs 
prior to World War One.262 He had a greater understanding of the region than most British 
citizens; however, his understanding paled when compared to the local Bedouins. His local 
forces regularly showed him routes, oases, and staging areas that he did not know existed. 
This indigenous experience and support enabled him to mask his movements and strike the 
Hejaz railway at will. The Greek guerrillas provided identical capabilities to the British 
and American advisors. Furthermore, both groups also provided valuable manpower to 
execute large sabotage operations. Similarly, the Weather Underground’s understanding of 
American culture because they were natives, particularly the far left and the radical 
underground movement, enabled them to avoid capture by law enforcement for years. The 
Weathermen moved generally at will across America under aliases acquired by stealing the 
identities of children who died.263 This paperwork loophole that the Weathermen 
discovered allowed them to acquire new identities regularly and maintain a steady bombing 
campaign. All indigenous partnerships have downsides. Lawrence had multiple 
experiences with the Arab bands leaving and joining operations at will. The British and 
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Americans had long running issues with particularly the communist Greek guerrillas 
committing war crimes.264 The Weathermen’s use of drugs and orgies as a way to bring 
the organization together actually created rifts that drove people away from the group. 
However, the usefulness and necessity of indigenous partners cannot be understated.  
3. Appropriate use of Technology 
Technology is often lauded as the answer to modern military problems. In actuality, 
technology does nothing by itself. It is the appropriate employment of specific technology 
for specific problems that provides benefit usually in the form of relative superiority.265 In 
all three case studies, the appropriate use of specific technology was part of what made 
them successful. For both Lawrence of Arabia and the Weather Underground, dynamite 
was the key technology. Small, stable, lightweight, and easily transportable, dynamite 
provided both campaigns with a precise destructive capability that they used extensively 
while ignoring other less effective technology.266 Other destructive technology was 
available during both campaigns, Lawrence in particular had access to airpower if he so 
desired, however, dynamite provided the ability to conduct precise sabotage in a way that 
aerial bombardment could not. Dynamite allowed bridges to be destroyed in such a manner 
that repairs were far more difficult than if the whole bridge had collapsed under 
bombardment. Dynamite allowed the Weathermen to produce lightweight bombs that they 
then were able to secret in places that larger explosives would not fit or would be too easily 
noticed. When the Weathermen blew up the Berkeley police station, they lodged the bomb 
under a car, where it was not noticed by multiple police officers.267 They used dynamite 
almost exclusively while ignoring other options such as fire-bombing, which was less 
precise. The Greek guerrillas were no stranger to dynamite. However, simpler technology 
was hugely beneficial to their campaign. Caltrops and concrete mines wreaked continual 
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havoc on Axis patrols causing constant casualties and vehicle repairs.268 These constant 
casualties and repairs had a huge morale impact on Axis forces, who viewed themselves as 
incessantly under threat by the locals. These low-cost simple pieces of equipment allowed 
small numbers of guerrillas to exact great tolls on the larger Axis occupation force.  
4. Command not Necessarily Control  
In all three case studies, limited control was exercised by command elements. More 
important than control was intent. In all three campaigns, the saboteurs were provided with 
the intent of their campaign, attack the Hejaz railway to contain the Medina Garrison, deny 
Germany access to Lines of Communication through Greece, and “bring the war home.” 
Outside of this intent, very little direct control of the saboteurs was conducted by 
commanders. Of the three case studies, Lawrence experienced the most control. He 
regularly traveled to British HQ in Cairo and had fairly routine interactions with his 
superiors. When in the field, though, he acted largely at will based on the conditions on the 
ground. He was not told how to conduct his operations.269 The British and American 
advisors to the Greeks had limited contact with British HQ in Alexandria. Once the 
Commandos infiltrated into Greece the British HQ had almost no control over them. In 
fact, after the first infiltration the British HQ lost the codenames for the commandos and 
was unable to contact them for months.270 The commandos operated largely on intent from 
their higher HQ. There was no discussion on how the commandos and Greek guerrillas 
were to accomplish specific tasks. The Weather Underground’s foreign supporters 
provided absolutely no command or control over them. Cuba and North Vietnam simply 
wanted the Weathermen to “bring the war home” to America and left it up to the 
Weathermen how they would accomplish the task. This limited level of external control  
appears very important for forces operating behind enemy lines and in occupied territories. 
It allows these forces to adapt to the reality on the ground. It allows them to take advantage 
of opportunities when they arise and avoid situations that are not ideal. Take for example 
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the Asopos viaduct sabotage. Because the operation was not tied to a specific date, the 
saboteurs were able to withdraw on their first attempt and return a month later and finish 
the job.271 Similarly, the Weather Underground was able to successfully regroup and 
reorganize following an accidental explosion at one of their safehouses that killed three of 
their members.272  
5. Effects based  
Sabotage campaigns generally require effects-based missions rather than time-
based missions. This builds off the command, not necessarily control, best practice. Owing 
to the complex nature of operating in denied territory, saboteurs may not be able to 
accomplish operations on a time schedule. This may be due to a myriad of reasons; 
increases in local security forces, lack of access to supplies, issues with indigenous 
partners, issues with access to the site, are only some of the problems that may occur. A 
general timeline for operations may exist, such was the case when British HQ asked the 
Greek guerrillas to increase sabotage operations in 1943.273 However, the timeline was 
exceptionally broad in order to allow the guerrillas to overcome any local issues. 
Possessing an effects-based campaign also allows local saboteurs to conduct operations 
randomly, which makes targeting by enemy forces decidedly more difficult and increases 
the safety of sabotage forces.  
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the Department 
of Homeland Security is responsible for monitoring, policing, and securing critical 
infrastructure in the United States.274 CISA has divided critical infrastructure into 16 
sectors:  
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Chemical - The Department of 
Homeland Security is designated as the 
Sector-Specific Agency for the 
Chemical Sector. 
 
Commercial Facilities - The 
Department of Homeland Security is 
designated as the Sector-Specific 
Agency for the Commercial Facilities 
Sector, which includes a diverse range 
of sites that draw large crowds of 
people for shopping, business, 
entertainment, or lodging 
Communications - The 
Communications Sector is an integral 
component of the U.S. economy, 
underlying the operations of all 
businesses, public safety organizations, 
and government. The Department of 
Homeland Security is the Sector-
Specific Agency for the 
Communications Sector 
Critical Manufacturing - The 
Department of Homeland Security is 
designated as the Sector-Specific 
Agency for the Critical Manufacturing 
Sector. 
 
Dams - The Department of Homeland 
Security is designated as the Sector-
Specific Agency for the Dams Sector. 
The Dams Sector comprises dam 
projects, navigation locks, levees, 
hurricane barriers, mine tailings 
impoundments, and other similar water 
retention and/or control facilities. 
 
Defense Industrial Base - The U.S. 
Department of Defense is the Sector-
Specific Agency for the Defense 
Industrial Base Sector. The Defense 
Industrial Base Sector enables 
research, development, design, 
production, delivery, and maintenance 
of military weapons systems, 
subsystems, and components or parts 
to meet U.S. military requirements. 
 
Figure 16. Sixteen Critical Infrastructure Sectors275 
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Emergency Services - The Department 
of Homeland Security is designated as the 
Sector-Specific Agency for the 
Emergency Services Sector. The sector 
provides a wide range of prevention, 
preparedness, response, and recovery 
services during both day-to-day 
operations and incident response. 
 
Energy - The U.S. energy infrastructure 
fuels the economy of the 21st century. 
The Department of Energy is the Sector-
Specific Agency for the Energy Sector. 
 
Financial Services - The Department of 
the Treasury is designated as the Sector-
Specific Agency for the Financial 
Services Sector. 
 
Food and Agriculture - The 
Department of Agriculture and the 
Department of Health and Human 
Services are designated as the co-
Sector-Specific Agencies for the Food 
and Agriculture Sector. 
 
Government Facilities - The Department 
of Homeland Security and the General 
Services Administration are designated as 
the Co-Sector-Specific Agencies for the 
Government Facilities Sector. 
 
Health Care and Public Health - The 
Department of Health and Human 
Services is designated as the Sector-
Specific Agency for the Healthcare and 
Public Health Sector. 
 
     Figure 16.  Sixteen Critical Infrastructure Sectors 
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Information Technology - The 
Department of Homeland Security is 
designated as the Sector-Specific 
Agency for the Information 
Technology Sector 
Nuclear Reactors Materials and Waste - 
The Department of Homeland Security is 
designated as the Sector-Specific Agency 
for the Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and 
Waste Sector. 
 
Transportation Systems - The 
Department of Homeland Security and 
the Department of Transportation are 
designated as the Co-Sector-Specific 
Agencies for the Transportation 
 
Water and Wastewater Systems - The 
Environmental Protection Agency is 
designated as the Sector-Specific Agency 
for the Water and Wastewater Systems 
Sector. 
 
   Figure 16.  Sixteen Critical Infrastructure Sectors 
 
The CISA has also identified what it refers to as National Critical Functions. These 
are: Connect, Distribute, Manage, and Supply276 
The Critical Infrastructure Sectors all support the National Critical Functions. 
While these delineations are specific to the overall infrastructure network of the United 
States, it is a valuable framework that can be used for any nation. This categorizing of 
critical infrastructure also provides clear avenues for further study.  
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the validity of sabotage in a multi-polar 
world. The case studies reflect this. However, the case studies in this thesis focus almost 
exclusively on the transportation and government facilities sectors and how they relate 
generally to the Distribute function. There remains ample room for continued study in this 
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venue alone. Within the Transportation sector, this thesis focuses solely on land-based 
transportation logistics. There remains a gap in understanding about the viability of 
transportation sabotage in the maritime and air domains. More importantly, there are an 
additional 14 sectors that remain unstudied. While not intended to, these two lists, 
developed by CISA, also indicate the breadth of sabotage effects that are potentially 
possible. It is recommended that further study place an emphasis on the sectors not studied 











V. ISSUES, THE FUTURE, AND FINAL THOUGHTS 
A. THERE ARE NO PANACEAS 
The world is a complex place full of complicated people; to believe that there is a 
singular answer to all problems is both ignorant and negligent. Operations and campaigns 
can be unsuccessful for a multitude of reasons, not least of which is the reality that the 
enemy always gets a vote. This thesis does not argue that sabotage is the ideal solution for 
all situations. Sabotage is a risky business. Saboteurs operate in hostile territory where both 
personal and operational dangers are high and legal protections are scant. Further, their 
operations often have strategic impacts and need to be carefully thought through before 
execution. In the positive, this occurred when Lawrence of Arabia’s Bedouin forces 
successfully contained the Medina garrison. However, a sabotage campaign gone wrong 
can unduly shine light on covert government activities, harm alliances, and harden the 
resolve of competitors. Such was the case with the CIA mining of Nicaraguan harbors in 
early 1984.277 
In the 1980s, the Central Intelligence Agency led and supported a number of covert 
action campaigns in Central America. Its largest campaign was against the Sandinista 
government in Nicaragua.278 The CIA’s Nicaraguan campaign was first authorized by 
President Jimmy Carter and later invigorated by President Ronald Reagan. The purpose of 
the campaign was to embolden democratic elements in Nicaragua and stop the flow of 
Soviet-supplied weaponry to El Salvador.279  
As part of this campaign, in late 1983, the CIA planned to sabotage multiple harbors 
in Nicaragua using mines. The primary means of Soviet arms supply to Nicaragua was via 
ship. The CIA hoped that mining the harbors would discourage Soviet ships from docking 
                                                 
277 Fred Hiatt and Joanne Omang, “CIA Helped to Mine Ports In Nicaragua,” News, Washington Post, 
April 7, 1984, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1984/04/07/cia-helped-to-mine-ports-in-
nicaragua/762f775f-6733-4dd4-b692-8f03c8a0aef8/. 
278 William J Daugherty, Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency (Lexington: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 204. 
279 Daugherty, 203–4; Daugherty, 190–91. 
100 
in Nicaragua and stem much of the arms flow. The purpose of the mines was to discourage 
shipping rather than destroy ships.280 Further, the CIA believed that mining the harbors 
would be economically crushing to the Sandinista government. This economic downturn 
would force the Sandinista government to negotiate with the U.S.-backed Contra guerrillas 
in Nicaragua.281 In January and February of 1984, the CIA placed a large ship 12 miles 
off the Nicaraguan coast as a base of operations. From this, they deployed multiple smaller 
speedboats that carried anti-ship mines. These small speedboats then emplaced mines in 
multiple Nicaraguan harbors. The mines were handmade and designed to explode loudly 
but with limited explosive effect. According to the CIA the mines were unlikely to sink a 
ship.282  
On March 5, 1985, the Los Angeles Times succinctly described the operation as “a 
fiasco.”283 The mines were indiscriminate and did not discourage shipping; rather, they 
encouraged an international outcry. Seven internationally flagged civilian cargo vessels 
were damaged by CIA mines, including ships from the Netherlands, Japan, Russia, and 
Britain.284 The CIA’s involvement was almost immediately discovered. The U.S. congress 
viewed the operation as a wild escalation of U.S. involvement and shut down funding for 
all covert operations in Nicaragua.285 Then Senator Joseph Biden publicly rebuked the 
CIA, saying  
On the question of whether or not anyone should be mining the harbor, the 
answer is no… I think it is outrageous. There is no reason to mine the 
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harbor. It is an act of war. These are not things that people should be 
condoning.286 
U.S. allies viewed it as a threat to international shipping. Britain lodged an informal 
complaint against the United States, and France went so far as to offer demining assistance 
to the Soviet-supported Sandinista government.287 While the CIA’s sabotage plan was well 
intentioned, in direct support of the Reagan Administration, it was not well targeted. The 
mines acted without regard for friendly or enemy vessels in an area where discrimination 
was needed. Further, the striking of allied civilian vessels was egregious, while the striking 
of Soviet vessels was not harsh enough to discourage them. Additionally, the nearly overt 
nature of the mining could have accidently escalated competition with the USSR rather 
than decrease it. The mining of Nicaraguan harbors was a scandal for both the Reagan 
administration and the CIA. It serves as a benchmark for how not to employ sabotage as a 
strategic tool.   
B. THE FUTURE IS DIFFERENT? 
Many experts harangue that the future is in cyber warfare.288 Beginning in 1992, 
John Arquilla argued that disrupting battlefield communication systems using cyber-
attacks would have detrimental effects on militaries world-wide.289 Since then, myriad 
experts have expanded this argument to say that cyber warfare can affect all aspects of 
modern life. In 2011, the U.S. Department of Defense declared cyber a warfighting domain 
along with air, land, sea, and space.290 The 2007 cyber-attack on Estonia and the 2010 
Stuxnet attack on the Iranian nuclear program are cited as proof that cyber warfare is here 
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and is destructive.291 Similar to sabotage, cyber-attacks commonly target the infrastructure 
backbone of a system. If these cyber weapons are the future, why then waste time on 
physical sabotage when a computer program can do the same thing? 
The answer is that cyber-attacks are generally boutique custom operations that lack 
repeatability. While Stuxnet, for example, was operationally successful, it is likely non-
repeatable.292 The vulnerability that was identified and used to damage Iranian centrifuges 
no longer exists. Once a cyber weapon is used, it becomes obsolete. Hardware and software 
manufacturers and technicians develop fixes to whatever malady the cyber weapon has 
imposed on the system.293 Further, cyber weapons are difficult and complex to produce. 
They require large amounts of time, effort, and inside knowledge of the target. 
Additionally, they can be difficult to employ, and their effects are generally less devastating 
than anticipated.294 This all means that cyber weapons are a potential option for a specific 
single use. This does not mean that they are inconsequential; it simply means that they are 
not easily manufactured or employed and generally lack repeatability. Conversely, the use 
of dynamite, explosives, and kinetic weapons for sabotage is timely, cheap, and highly 
repeatable.  
In contrast to Stuxnet take the 2013 physical attack on the Metcalf, California, 
transformer station. In April 2013, saboteurs used .30 caliber rifles to kinetically attack the 
500Kv transformer station in Metcalf, which supports electricity to the San Francisco Bay 
area. The saboteurs struck the radiators for the station, causing to them spill their cooling 
oil. This caused the transformers to overheat and become inoperative.295 The attack lasted 
19 minutes and used approximately 100 rounds of rifle ammunition. In total, 17 
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transformers were damaged which took 27 days to repair, and cost of $15 million.296 To 
highlight how easy the sabotage was to conduct, John Lightfoot, the head of the FBI’s 
counterterror task force in San Francisco, said  
it doesn’t take a very high degree of training or access to technology to carry 
out this attack.297  
While the electric grid did not fail because of the attack, Pacific Gas and Electric, who 
owns the Metcalf station, was forced to emergency re-route power and increase power 
production at multiple other stations, which caused further stress on the grid until Metcalf 
was repaired.298  
The Metcalf sabotage, along with several smaller similar incidents across the U.S., 
caused a complete congressional review of the physical security of the U.S. electric grid, 
as well as the proposing of several pieces of legislation to support physical security (HR 
4298 and S. 2158).299 The findings from this review found that the sabotage of high voltage 
transformers is extremely easy to conduct, requires little to no training, and is almost 
impossible to prevent. Specifically, puncturing the 5/8 - to 3/4- inch steel tank that houses 
a transformer can short circuit and completely destroy it. Additionally, draining the 
insulating oil will damage the transformers and potentially cause them to explode. A 2005 
rifle attack against a transformer in Florida did exactly this, blowing up the transformer 
station and causing a blackout.300 Additionally, industry experts described the difficulty 
that exists in replacing high voltage transformers. They are usually custom designed and 
cost between $3 and $5 Million. This makes the storing of replacement transformers 
prohibitively expensive and, due to their custom nature, often untenable. The transportation 
                                                 
296 Mark Memmott, “Sniper Attack On Calif. Power Station Raises Terrorism Fears,” news, NPR.org, 
February 5, 2014, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/02/05/272015606/sniper-attack-on-calif-
power-station-raises-terrorism-fears; David Baker, “FBI: Attack on PG&E South Bay Substation Wasn’t 
Terrorism,” News, SFGate, September 11, 2014, https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/FBI-Attack-on-
PG-amp-E-substation-in-13-wasn-t-5746785.php. 
297 Baker, “FBI: Attack on PG&E South Bay Substation Wasn’t Terrorism.” 
298 Memmott, “Sniper Attack On Calif. Power Station Raises Terrorism Fears.” 
299 Parfomak, “Physical Security of the U.S. Power Grid: High-Voltage Transformer Substations,” 2. 
300 Parfomak, 7. 
104 
of high voltage transformers also requires the use of specialized rail cars, of which there 
are fewer than 20 in the United States. Movement of high voltage transformers over roads 
is possible, but even fewer trucks exist that can haul such a load, and most roads cannot 
handle the weight of the transformers. Interestingly, the congressional report also states 
that electric infrastructure worldwide is designed similarly to the U.S. but usually less 
robust.301        
This simple comparison between contemporary cyber and physical sabotage 
operations shows that both offer capability to their employers. There is little doubt that 
cyber warfare serves a specific purpose in competition. However, physical sabotage 
provides a timeliness and more importantly a repeatability that cyber-attacks simply do not 
provide. Perhaps as final proof of the difficulty in securing physical infrastructure and the 
repeatability of physical operations, it is worth noting that Pacific Gas and Electric invested 
$100 million in security upgrades at its transformer stations after the Metcalf sabotage. 
Despite this, just over a year later, in August of 2014, burglars broke into the Metcalf 
station and stole $40,000 in equipment without arousing security personnel on site.302   
C. FINAL THOUGHTS AND CONCLUSION 
Does sabotage and more specifically sabotage campaigns serve as a means to deter, 
deny, coerce, and impose kinetic costs on competitors in a multipolar world? Yes. 
However, with that said, a myriad of questions surrounding sabotage remain unanswered. 
Some that quickly come to light are: What organization, unit, or person is best suited to 
conduct such acts in today’s world? What are the moral and ethical ramifications and 
concerns regarding infrastructure sabotage? Does a modern legal framework exist to 
support the employment of sabotage? Will the development of genetically engineered anti-
material weapons cause a revolution in military capabilities and become what dynamite 
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was to T.E. Lawrence?303 These and many other unstated questions regarding sabotage 
should be both asked and answered. Practitioners, scholars, and leaders should leave no 
stone unturned in exploring the possibilities and complexities of interstate competition. 
This thesis has only partially overturned a stone.  
This thesis has argued that sabotage is ultimately a violent kinetic business for the 
purpose of denying an enemy access to a capability or resource. Further, sabotage 
operations have an extremely broad scope. History shows that one operation can be a 
kinetic raid while another is completely surreptitious. Enemy forces or civilians could be 
killed during one operation and there could be no collateral damage in another. It is a 
complex job with long-lasting implications. However, the campaigns of Lawrence of 
Arabia, the Greek Guerrillas, and the Weather Underground, as well as the multiple smaller 
operations discussed herein, show both the viability, flexibility, and impact that sabotage 
can have.  
The fact that the world still relies on the same infrastructure backbone that existed 
when all these acts occurred further bolsters the argument that sabotage remains a valid 
and viable means to impose kinetic costs on competitors. Additionally, the increasing 
reliance on this infrastructure to enable and employ advanced military technology exposes 
a critical vulnerability in modern militaries. While the evidence for sabotage serving as an 
escalation control measure is mixed in the case studies examined, during an outright 
conflict, the evidence seems to show that sabotage campaigns can reduce the duration of a 
conflict, as well as the number of casualties. Additionally, sabotage campaigns serve as 
valuable economy of force operations by utilizing small groups of saboteurs, which allows 
for the preservation of friendly combat power. In a multipolar environment, it is paramount 
to possess a comprehensive deterrence and compellence strategy. The historical evidence 
points to the fact that sabotage campaigns can serve as a valuable component of a robust 
strategy for winning in Great Power Competition.  
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